Mexico and the World
Vol. 5, No 2 (Spring 2000)
http://www.profmex.org/mexicoandtheworld/volume5/2spring00/00boardman6.html

Conclusion  

      The new leaders elected by the 1999-2000 elections in the United States, Mexico, Chile and will determine FTAA's future.  Their policies will either generate public support for FTAA or allow the goal of a integration in 2005 to slip quietly away.  Ultimately, Congressional approval of Fast-Track Authority for the next United States President and the overall economic stability of countries throughout the Western Hemisphere are crucial elements for the successful FTAA implementation. 

      The United States may be more receptive towards FTAA after the 2000 or 2004 elections.  This is predicated upon the relationship between the next U.S. President and Congress.  A Republican president and Republican majority in both the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate might be inclined to approve Fast-Track and FTAA.  On the other hand, a Democratic President and Democratic majority in either the U.S. House of Representatives or the U.S. Senate would be mostly likely to opppose any new trade agreement due to opposition from highly organized labor and environmental interests.  In the eventuality that one party retains control of the White House and the other of the U.S. Congress, it is most probable there will be no consensus or new leadership on the issue between 2000-2004. 

      If the United States does not aggressively support FTAA, the trade agreement is unlikely to find strong support from other countries in the hemisphere for implementation.  In the event of this outcome, the United States will continue to carefully monitor growing trade relations between other countries in the Western Hemispheres and the EU and APEC.  As Henry Kissinger as expressed, the U.S. has a geopolitical concern with the growth of other trade blocs including MERCOSUR, which is based on its desire to maintain hegemonic dominance in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
     Mexico has its own interests for retaining the current status quo and not implementing FTAA.  It is currently the only Latin American signatory to the North American Free Trade Agreement.  This has given it significant advantages including increased foreign investment and the relocation of American and Japanese factories along the U.S.-border that provide job opportunities. If FTAA were to become a reality, the competitive advantages currently enjoyed by Mexico would disappear.  Without FTAA, other countries and trade blocs (e.g. EU and MERCOSUR) will remain interested in expanding trade with Mexico.  Mexico would lose international clout and would be less attractive to foreign investors if FTAA were ever succesfully implemented. 

     The 1999-2000 elections in the Southern Cone demonstrated a leftist political renewal.  The economic benefits resulting from increased free trade, privatization, and economic integration appear to have increased public demand for public investment in social programs.  Unlike the Socialists of the Cold War period, new leftist leaders such as Richardo Lagos in Chile and Fernando de la Rua in Argentina promise to continue support for the free market economy and foreign investment. During their elections, economic recession in Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay lent credibility to leftist concerns that further hemispheric integration might prompt violent social, political, and economic shocks such as the ones that Mexico endured following 1994 implementation of NAFTA.  The Southern Cone's interest is now to further regional integration under MERCOSUR and increase this trade bloc's ties to Europe and Asia.  This demonstrates that the region is not comfortable with an unabashed cultivation of the United States.  Neither is it ready to support hemispheric integration under FTAA and a dominant U.S. economy if this means loses of power and status for MERCOSUR. 

     In sum, Argentina and Uruguay will continue to support MERCOSUR and the extension of historical ties to the EU.  Chile will continue its aggressive trade policies, including membership in MERCOSUR and the expansion of new relations throughout the Pacific Rim.  None of these countries have a overbearing interest in pushing for the implementation of FTAA if the United States is not fully supporting this trade policy with Fast-Track Authority.  Without U.S. support, FTAA in 2005 is doomed to failure.