Mexico and the World
Vol. 5, No 2 (Spring 2000)
http://www.profmex.org/mexicoandtheworld/volume5/2spring00/00boardman5.html

MERCOSUR Favors Regional Integration First

     MERCOSUR, the Southern Cone's emerging trade bloc was only in its formative phase at the time FTAA was announced in 1994.  Members of this union have ambitions of eventually evolving into a full-fledged common market.  As such, this trade bloc presents competition for NAFTA and FTAA within the Western Hemipshere.  Trade ministers from MERCOSUR's member countries have been negotiating as a unified bloc at FTAA meetings since 1997 on issues of common concern such as farm subidies and intellectual property.  Brazil, the largest member of MERCOSUR has led a move to stall FTAA negotiations while the southern market consolidates.  Presidential elections in Argentina and Uruguay in late 1999 demonstrated strong public support for politicians in favor of strengthening MERCOSUR.⁸⁵ 

     MERCOSUR is an acronym for Mercado Común del Cono Sur (southern cone common market).  It was created in March 1991 under the Treaty of Asunción signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.  All totaled, MERCOSUR’s population is approximately 213 million and its gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998 was $US1.11 billion.  It is regulated by an intergovernmental structure that oversees the reduction of common external tariffs amongst member countries.  Key sectors such as services, banking, and the free movement of labor currently remain outside of the MERCOSUR’s authority as they are still being negotiated.⁸⁶ 

     This trade bloc is a result of trade negotiations between Argentina and Brazil in the 1980's.  Following the return to democracy, both countries were interested in exploring new ways to manage their outstanding foreign debts, find industrial complementarity and promote technical cooperation between their economies.  A series of trade treaties signed in 1986, known collectively as the PICAB Treaty (Programa de Integración y Cooperación Argentino-Brasileño) created a binational decision-making body.  This new structure was responsible for reaching additional agreements on economic, military, technical, and nuclear issues.  Among these was the 1988 General Treaty for Integration Cooperation and Development that proposed the establishment of a joint economic community by 1998.  This period of integration was shortened in 1990 by agreement between Presidents Carlos Saúl Menem and Fernando Collor de Mello.  Both leaders also decided to invite neighboring Paraguay and Uruguay to join their next accord.  The Treaty of Asunción was signed in March 1991 with the understanding that MERCOSUR would come into existence in 1994.

Regional integration is MERCOSUR's primary goal.  This process began in earnest in the mid-1990's.  Peter Stern, international trade manager for the American Chamber of Commerce in São Paulo notes that this was easy to accomplish at the outstart as each country emphasized its strengths.  Brazil promoted building machinery and farming equipment, Argentina sold its wheat and oil, Uruguay produced more wool and dairy products, and Paraguay had a larger market for its cotton.  Notably, the majority of MERCOSUR's trade (approximately three-quarters of internal exchanges) has been between Argentina and Brazil.87       The Hidrovía, a  proposed internal fluvial transportation network was one of MERCOSUR's first development projects.  An inter-governmental committee was appointed to oversee dredging a channel along the 3,400 kilometer Paraná, Paraguay, and Rio de la Plata river systems.  Its main job was to remove rocks and river curves that impeded barges traffic during the rainy and dry seasons.  Its goal was to devise an alternative transportation network that would alleviate growing pressure on the trucking industry to handle internal MERCOSUR trade.  As a secondary benefit, modernized port facilities offered the opportunity to improve inspection procedures and deter smuggling. Brazil was the most enthusiastic supporter of the project.  It was attracted by the efficiencies that a reliable river system would bring to soybean exporters who began developing new crop lands along the shores of Paraná and Paraguay rivers in the 1980’s.

Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (left)  meets with Argentine President Carlos Saúl Menem (right)  of Argentina in October 1999 during the final months of  Menem’s presidency.  Courtesy of Reuters

In 1998-1999, MERCOSUR's regional integration was retarded by three set-backs.  First, the Hidrovía project was halted due to considerable opposition from international environmental organizations.  They argued that dredging would devastate the vast Pantanal wetlands at the headwaters of the river system in Mato Grosso, Brazil.  This area is the habitat of an estimated 150,000 species of birds, plants, and animals.  A campaign organized by over 300 environmental groups in North and South America successfully lobbied the Inter-American Development Bank, United Nations, U.S. State Department, World Bank, and other international financial organizations to cut funding for the project.88  Without international financing, IBAMA, the Brazilian federal environmental agency abandoned the “official” Hidrovía project in March 1998.  Today, the project continues in a modified form with MERCOSUR working to improve minor impediments such as clearing rocks from the rivers.89

Barges on the Paraná-Paraguay River Courtesy of International Rivers Network

Second, in March 1999 MERCOSUR’s reputation was tarnished by the brutal assassination of Paraguay’s Vice President Luis Maria Argana.  The implication that Paraguayan President Raúl Cubas and former Army Chief General Lino Oviedo had orchestrated the murder called into question the region’s commitment to human rights and democracy.  Brazil and Argentina moved quickly to stabilize the political turmoil by granting asylum to Cubas and Oviedo.90  This allowed the Paraguayan Congress installed Luis González Macchi as President.  He will serve the remainder of Cubas’ term until late 2003.91

     Third, the region has been coping with an economic recession that began when Brazilian financial markets plummeted in response to fluctuations in the global economy.  The Russian economic crisis of 1998 caused investors in emerging markets around the world to withdraw their capital.  Economic problems in Asia compounded the situation, causing capital flight from Brazil at a rate of $280 million a day by November 1998.⁹²  By the spring of 1999, Brazil’s instability had begun to have a negative effect on Argentina. To control the economic crisis, Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso negotiated a strategic privatization package that included a $42 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).⁹³  As Argentine Trade Secretary Alberto de las Carreras noted, the crisis forced MERCOSUR to "its most difficult point since its creation.”⁹⁴  Today, the economies of member nations are on a cautious path to recovery. 
 

 

Courting Both U.S. and European Trade  

     MERCOSUR's growing international clout since the mid-1990's has raise concern among American policymakers.  Henry Kissinger believes that it is a mistake for U.S. foreign policy to ignore this new union.  He has chastised American politicans and diplomats “retreating from its own initiatives,” including FTAA and Fast-Track Authority.  He warns that “if U.S. policymakers continue to ignore Latin America’s attempts to transcend the nation-state, they will evolve to their own rhythm without reference to a larger hemispheric structure” or U.S. interests.⁹⁵ 

     Kissinger’s position is based on the premise that a strong MERCOSUR will damage FTAA and American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.  It is not based on economic facts.  Trade statistics demonstrate that U.S. exporters have been the main beneficiaries of the trade bloc’s growth.  MERCOSUR’s growth has resulted in an increased demand for U.S. exports.  As Figure 5 indicates, U.S. exports grew 228% from US$ 10.7 trillion in 1991 to US$ 24.4 trillion in 1998.  In contrast, U.S. imports from the region were not nearly as high, rising from 142% from US$ 10.3 trillion in 1991 to US$ 14.6 trillion in 1998. The difference in trade has created a balance in favor of the United States. 

     To date, MERCOSUR officials have side-stepped the issue of U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.  With the United States hamstrung by lack of Fast-Track Authority, MERCOSUR has proceeded to develop new relationships with the European Union, its second largest trade partner.  Both parties are interested in expanding their trade and are in the process of negotiating an EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement.  Representatives met in Rio de Janeiro in June 1999 to discuss a future accord, “based on respect for democracy and human rights, sustainable development and a determination to stamp out trade in illegal drugs.”  Although the summit ended without any final conclusions due to the ongoing Braziilan financial crisis, representatives did set the framework for continuing talks.  All parties agreed that there would be no possibility of tariff cuts until mid-2001 and that any forthcoming free trade arrangement would take effect over a 10-year period.⁹⁶  Ever mindful of the U.S. Monroe Doctrine warning against European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, the Europeans diplomatically stated that a future accord would had  no intention of competing with the United States or FTAA.  Clearly, both the EU and MERCOSUR look forward to closer economic cooperation including new investments in MERCOSUR from Spain, Italy, and Germany. 
 
 

 

Argentina's Changing Foreign Trade Policies (1983-1999) 

     In October 1999, Argentina elected a new President for 1999-2003.  Fernando de la Rua is a fiscal conservative from the center-left Allianza party (also known as Unión Radical Cívica) who campaigned to crack down on graft and corruption.  Prior to his election as President, he was opposition leader and mayor of Buenos Aires.  His campaign slogan “return Argentina to dignity” referred to alleged corruption in the Menem administration. 

De la Rua is Argentina’s third democratically elected President since the overthrow of the military government in 1983.  His election restores the Allianza party to power.  The party's first President was Raúl Alfonsín who held office from 1983-1989.  His main priorities were to repair Argentina’s standing in world affairs following the Falkland Islands-Malvinas War and to control economic instability.  Alfonsín was responsible for reorganizing the armed forces, charging former military and political leaders with human rights abuses, restructuring the foreign debt, and introducing fiscal reforms.  Despite his efforts, during his administration inflation skyrocketed to over 200% a month.

President-Elect Fernando de la Rua  (L) and former President Raúl Alfonsín (R) celebrating at an Allianza victory party in October 1999 Courtesy of Reuters

 

    The Allianza party was ousted   from power when Peronista nominee Carlos Saúl Menem was elected   President in 1989.⁹⁷  He served two successful   terms from 1989-1995 and 1995-1999.    During his tenure,   he concentrated on liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.    In 1991, his government brought inflation under control with “convertibility”   reform.  At the same time, Menem resolved that he would repair Argentina’s   standing in foreign affairs by concentrating on two foreign relations priorities:

strengthening MERCOSUR; and

strengthening relations with the United States under what his Foreign Minister Guido DiTella described as a new policy of relaciones carnales. 

  Traditionally, Argentina had always seen itself   as a world power and competed with the United States for hegemony in the   Western Hemisphere.  Menem defied a hundred years of Argentine foreign   policy tradition when he acknowledged that Argentina would accept the world   power structure “as it exists, rather than as Argentina would like it to   be.”⁹⁸  He openly supported U.S. initiatives   in the world arena including the Gulf War and FTAA.  At the end of   his second term, Menem proposed elevating Argentina’s relationship with   the United States to a new level of inter-dependence suggesting the nation   dollarize the peso.   

     Menem’s dollarization proposal was based on the success of his “convertibility” monetary reform policy.  To control the inflation that had overtaken Alfonsín’s administration, Menem authorized Argentina’s currency board to limit the stock of hard-currency reserves in 1991. Convertibility made it more difficult for investors to withdraw their capital.  At the same time, the government was prohibited from easing monetary policy or devaluation.  In general, the reforms eliminated hyperinflation and stimulated growth.⁹⁹  Under Menem’s leadership, Argentine economy’s boomed with growth rates of 9% in 1996-1997.¹⁰⁰ 

The Menem administration began informal dollarization talks with U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve officials in January 1999.  Menem risked public condemnation in Argentina to make the proposal to the United States.  He reasoned that since the dollar already accounted for approximately 70% of Argentina’s money supply, he should explore the possibility of total conversion.101  U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers responded to Menem’s overtures by requesting that Argentina initiate a formal treaty proposal.  According to the New York Times, drafts indicated that “Argentina might consider granting the Federal Reserve a strong supervisory role over Argentine financial institutions; guarantee that the Argentine government control its fiscal and current account deficits; and liberalize the Argentine private sector's ability to fire employees to make local businesses and products more competitive on international markets.”102

U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers meeting with Argentine President Carlos Saúl Menem in December 1999 in Buenos Aires during the final days of  Menem’s Presidency. Courtesy of Reuters

Argentina’s dollarization proposal was based on      Menem’s opinion that the dollar should become a regional currency like      Europe's new euro.  Conceivably, this would happen if Argentina, Brazil,      and Mexico converted to dollars.  Carlos Fedrigotti, president of      Citibank in Argentina, viewed Menem’s suggestion as a “shocking novelty.”       At the Federal Reserve, Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed disinterest and      skepticism.  Argentines in the private sector received the proposal      with apprehension.  Discouraged by the reception of his idea, Menem      concluded in the final days of his Presidency that “dollarizing is long-term      project, not crisis management and it will require not just the agreement      of the United States, but also a consensus in Argentina.”¹⁰³ 
      
   Argentina is currently in a serious recession.  Growth rates dropped from 8.6% in 1997 to 2% in 1999.  This has been caused by low international prices for agricultural exports; recession and devaluation in Brazil; and the appreciation of the American dollar.  To keep inflation under control and the economy in check, De la Rua has agreed to maintain Memen’s fiscal monetary reform pegging the peso to the U.S. dollar known as “convertibility.”  While this will not be altered, other trade      and foreign policy objectives are subject to modification.  One of the most likely policy changes will be a cooling in U.S.-Argentine relations.      

While Menem worked arduously to strengthen this relationship, De la Rua will most probably implement a more traditional Argentine position of non-alignment.¹⁰⁴      

He is also likely to support strenthening MERCOSUR rather than push for implementation of FTAA. 
           

    

MERCOSUR Trade - The Catalyst of Uruguayan Poltics  
 

In 1999, MERCOSUR’s economic crisis generated strong support for a new leftist coalition that severely challenged Uruguay's traditonal two party sytem during the legislative and presidential elections.  Taking advantage of growing unemployment rates related to the contraction in MERCOSUR trade, Socialist Presidential candidate Tabaré Vazquez campaigned for socio-economic change.  He won the first round of the Presidential election in October 1999 with 38.5% of the vote.  One month later he was defeated by 72-year old Jorge Batlle, nominee from the ruling Colorado party.  Batlle is a veteran politician who ran for President five times and represented Montevideo in the Uruguayan House of Delegates prior to the military government takeover in 1973.105

Three presidential candidates: Socialist Frente Amplio – Tabaré Vazquez (L),  Colorado (Ruling Party, centrist) – Jorge Batlle (C),  Blanco (center-right) – Luis Alberto LaCalle (R)  October 1999, Courtesy of Reuters

 

Vazquez represented the Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio party,  a loose coalition of socialists, communists, and leftists.  Popular support for the party's agenda during the 1999 election gave Frente-Amplio 40% of the 30 Senate seats and 40% of the 99 House of Delegates.106  Its presidential nominee, Tabaré Vazquez is a 59-year old medical doctor and former mayor of Montevideo.  He campaigned to create a $300 million dollar emergency plan that would address unemployment, health, and housing issues.   He proposed increasing spending on education and other social services by raising taxes on wealthy individuals and private business sectors that had prospered under MERCOSUR’s expansion in the mid-1990’s.107       Uruguayan politicans from the Colorado and Blanco parties joined forces to defeat Vasquez during the November run-off election.  They exposed Vazquez' involvement in a corruption investigation at the National Institute of Oncology (Instituto Nacional de Oncología – INDO).108  Although Vazquez countered that these were unfounded allegations, this scandal gave Battle the edge he need to win by a 54% to 45%.109

Leftist Vazquez supporter wearing a Ché Guevara t-shirt and celebrating Vazquez' first round victory October 1999, Courtesy of Reuters

 

Prior to this election, Uruguayan politics had been characterized by power sharing between the rival Colorado and Blanco      parties.  Following the end of military rule in 1985, Colorado nominee Julio Maria Sanguinetti was elected President for a  five-year term.

       As a centrist, he implemented policies that were primarily aimed at reducing inflation. Conservative Blanco candidate Luis Alberto LaCalle succeeded Sanguinetti from 1990-1995.  LaCalle’s primary policy objectives were      privatization and reducing the role of the state in the nation’s economy.

       His ambitions were thwarted by a successful national plebiscite, which demanded that certain key sectors remain under government control.

       As a result, the 1994 election was closely contested.  Sanguinetti narrowly won a second term in office from 1995-1999.  During his second administration, he made moderate efforts to encourage a market-oriented economy.

  He balanced privatization with an increase in education spending and reform of the social security system.      

     As evidenced by the closeness of the 1999 election, Uruguay’s major concern is the stability and expansion of MERCOSUR.  Statistics in Tables 14 and 15 demonstrate that Argentina and Brazil are more important trading partners than the United States, Europe, or Asia.  Commerce with neighboring Argentina and Brazil accounts for approximately 40-45% of Uruguayan trade.¹¹⁰  American-Uruguayan trade, even through it has a slightly negative balance in favor of the U.S., totals less than 10% of Uruguay’s international commerce.  MERCOSUR’s success is of paramount importance to the Uruguayan economy.  It is unlikely that in the future, Uruguay will support FTAA if this means a reduction in MERCOSUR's strength and international clout. 
 

Table 14 Uruguayan Exports to its 10 Largest Trading Partners (Ranking Based on Year 1995) $US Thousands  

	1994		1995		1996
Brazil	493,452	25.8	700,066	33.2	908,354	37.9
Argentina	382,345	20.0	267,099	12.7	267,937	11.2
United States	132,447	6.9	126,345	6.0	144,147	6.0
China	115,045	6.0	123,518	5.9	116,175	4.8
Germany	121,327	6.3	118,036	5.6	93,805	3.9
United Kingdom	71,940	3.8	87,089	4.1	53,944	2.3
Italy	60,283	3.1	65,425	3.1	73,664	3.1
Netherlands	48,181	2.5	54,824	2.6	39,638	1.7
Spain	33,228	1.7	53,300	2.5	37,834	1.6
Hong Kong (China)	33,171	1.7	48,783	2.3	86,198	3.6
TOTAL 1-10	1,491,419	77.9	1,644,485	78.1	1,821,696	76.0

 Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Statistics and Quantitative Analysis Unit, Oct. 1999    Table 15 Uruguayan Imports from its 10 Largest Trading Partners (Ranking Based on Year 1995) $US Thousands    

	1994		1995	%	1996	%
Brazil	745,728	27.5	698,458	24.4	745,452	22.4
Argentina	608,855	22.5	608,587	21.2	690,701	20.8
United States	262,510	9.7	283,948	9.9	405,706	12.2
Italy	137,753	5.1	147,804	5.2	171,426	5.2
Spain	83,094	3.1	106,294	3.7	103,337	3.1
Germany	93,732	3.5	104,126	3.6	100,437	3.0
France	78,960	2.9	100,256	3.5	117,860	3.5
Japan	78,565	2.9	73,263	2.6	72,079	2.2
Korea	50,517	1.9	49,887	1.7	61,745	1.9
Chile	45,491	1.7	49,291	1.7	55,401	1.7
TOTAL 1-10	2,185,205	80.7	2,221,914	77.5	2,524,144	76.0

 Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Statistics and Quantitative Analysis Unit, Oct. 1999    Figure 6  Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights    

  Next Section 
Conclusion

Notes 

⁸⁵  Kevin G. Hall, “Economic Woes Drive MERCOSUR to Clean Up Its Own House,” Journal of Commerce, 12 March 1998 and Jason Webb, “34 Nations in Americas Seek Free Trade Zone,” Washington Times, 18 June 1998. 

⁸⁶  Thierry Ogier, “Complementary Trade of MERCOSUR Thrives,” Journal of Commerce, 12 March 1998; Jason Webb, “34 Nations in Americas Seek Free Trade Zone,” Washington Times, 18 June 1998; Organización de Estados Americanos, Sistema de Información al Comercio Exterior, Acuerdo del Mercado Común del Cono Sur (MERCOSUR), [1995-99] <http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsr1/htm>; and Embajada de Uruguay en EEUU, translation of “MERCOSUR and its Origins” El País [Montevideo] [1996]  <http://www.embassy.ury/uruguay/econ/MERCOSUR/merc-002.html.>. 

⁸⁷  Ogier,“Complementary Trade of MERCOSUR Thrives,” and Hall, “Economic Woes Drive MERCOSUR to Clean Up Its Own House.” 

⁸⁸  For more on this international environmental coalition and its objectives see Coalizão Rios Vivos [1999] <http://www.riosvivos.org.br/>. 

⁸⁹  “Brazil Pulls Out of Destructive Project in Wetlands,” Environmental Defense Fund Newsletter, June 1998 <http://www.edf.org/pubs/edf%2Dletter/1998/jun/c%5Fbrazil.html>; Secretaria Ejecutiva C.I.H., Hidrovía Paraguay-Paraná [1999] <http://www.ssdnet.com.ar/hidrovia/index1.htm>; International Rivers Network, The Paraná-Paraguay River Campaign [September 1999] <http://www.irn.org/programs/hidrovia/index.html>; and Conservation International, Hidrovía Development Project [1998] <http://www.conservation.org/RAP/Aqua/PRIORITY/SITES/PANTANAL/Hidrovia.htm#hidrovia>. 

⁹⁰  "MERCOSUR Leaders To Lick Wounds But Speak Bravely," CNN, 11 June 1999. 

⁹¹  Raúl Cubas Grau is a member of the National Republican Association (ANR, also known as the Colorado Party).  He won a five-year term as President on May 10, 1998 with 53.74% of the vote. Argana became Vice President when former Army Chief Lino Oviedo, an ally and mentor of Cubas, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for attempting to oust sitting President Juan Wasmosy in 1996. Oviedo had defeated Argana in a party primary.   For more see International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), 1998 Election Guide [1999] <http://www.ifes.org/eguide/elecguide.htm>; “Paraguay Hunts For Vice President's assassins,” CNN, 23 March 1999 <http://cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9903/23/paraguay.attack.03/index.html>; “Impeached Paraguayan President Calls It Quits,” CNN, 28 March 1999 <http://cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9903/28/paraguay/index.html>; “Paraguay Gets New President As Military Leader Flees To Argentina,” CNN, 29 March 1999 <http://cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9903/29/paraguay.01/index.html>. 

⁹²  David E. Sanger, “Brazil is to get IMF Package for $42 Billion,” New York Times, 13 Nov. 1998. 

⁹³  Hall, “Economic Woes Drive MERCOSUR to Clean Up Its Own House;” Kevin Hall, “Crises Dim Prospects for Americas Free Trade,” Journal of Commerce, 5 Feb. 1998; and "MERCOSUR Leaders To Lick Wounds But Speak Bravely," CNN, 11 June 1999. 

⁹⁴  Up until the Brazilian IMF crisis, the IMF and US Treasury had only stepped into help countries when they were on the brink of default.  When the Brazilian financial package was authorized, Brazil still had $40 billion in reserves at the IMF.  The $42 billion to stabilize the Brazilian economy came from a U.S. loan to the IMF.  Of the $42 billion, $5 billion was US taxpayer money. Instant access to the funds was granted based on the condition that the Brazilian government would immediately approve key administrative reforms. David E. Sanger, “Brazil is to get IMF Package for $42 Billion,” New York Times, 13 Nov. 1998. 

⁹⁵  Henry A. Kissinger, “Expand Free Trade to All Western Hemisphere,” Los Angeles Times, 27 April 1997. 

⁹⁶  Peter Muello, “Rio Summit Leaders Regulate Capital,” AP, 26 June 1999. 

⁹⁷  In 1995, Menem received 47.49% of the vote.  He defeated José Octavio Bordon representing a leftist coalition that included Frepaso (25.2% of the vote) and Allianza (Union Cívica Radical) candidate Horatio Massaccesi (17.1% of the vote). International CNN Election Watch, Argentina [1999]  <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/electon.watch/americas/argentina.html>. 
 
⁹⁸   Joseph S. Tulchin, “Continuity and Change in Argentine Foreign Policy,” in Latin American Nations in World Politics, Heraldo Muñoz and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1996), 185-191. 

⁹⁹  Under this new system, Argentina was severely tested during the 1994-1995 Mexico devaluation crisis.  Numerous Argentine banks defaulted, decreasing their total number from 2000 to approximately 140.  Menem’s banking reforms encouraged acquisitions by foreign banks who supplied new capital for investments that stimulated record economic growth.  Foreign banks now hold approximately 50% of all bank deposits in Argentina. Douglass Stinson, “Staking Out the High Ground,” Latin Trade, November 1998, 44; and "Argentina Down To Earth," The Economist, 15 May 1999. 

¹⁰⁰  In 1998, as result of the Brazilian crisis, Argentine growth decreased to 4.3%.  U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Argentina [1999] <http://www.odce.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ar.html> 

¹⁰¹  Menem was particularly interested to know if the Federal Reserve would agree to be the lender of last resort in case an Argentine bank should fail.  He also wanted to know if the United States would compensate the Argentine Central Bank for the US$750 million it would lose annually in interest earned from the U.S. Treasury bills if it converted to dollars.  "Argentina Down To Earth," The Economist, 15 May 1999. 

¹⁰²  Julia Preston, "Mexico Measures Identity in Pesos vs. Dollars," New York Times, 16 May 1999; and Clifford Krauss, "Buck Doesn’t' Stop: Now Argentina May Adopt It," New York Times, 25 Feb. 1999. 

¹⁰³  Krauss; and "Argentina Down To Earth," The Economist, 15 May 1999. 

¹⁰⁴  “Argentine Opposition Leader Wins Presidential Election,” CNN, 25 Oct. 1999. 

¹⁰⁵  “Historia de un Luchador Incansable,” Perfiles, Elecciones ’99, El País [Montevideo], 1 Nov. 1999 <http://www.diarioelpais.com/suplementos3/elecciones99/perfiles/per_colorado.html>. 

¹⁰⁶  In the legislature, Vazquez’ Frente Amplio increased its representation in the Senate by 13% and House of Delegates by 7% in this election to hold 40% of the 30 Senate seats and 40% of the 99 House of Delegates.  CIA, World Factbook, Uruguay [1999] <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/uy.html>; “Uruguayan Socialist Calls First-Round Win ‘Historic’ Runoff Looms,” CNN, 1 Nov. 1999. 

¹⁰⁷  Luis LaCalle, nominee of the center-right Blanco party received 21% of the vote and was eliminated from the November run-off election. “Exit Polls Show Leftist Leading In Uruguay,” Washington Post, 1 Nov. 1999.   “Uruguayan Socialist Calls First-Round Win ‘Historic;’ Runoff Looms,” CNN, 1 Nov. 1999; and Elecciones ’99, El País [Montevideo], 1 Nov. 1999. <http://www.diarioelpais.com/suplementos3/elecciones99/> 

¹⁰⁸  Vazquez faced charges accusing him of using his position as Director of Radiology to recommend that INDO purchase computer equipment from his son’s company.  Vazquez denounced the judges reviewing his case noting that the charges had been filed two years prior and legal review had been delayed to thwart his political career.  "Lacalle Dijo Que La Respuesta De Los Votantes Blancos Fue El Mejor Elogio Para La Decisión Del Directorio - Hemos Sido Determinantes,” El País [Montevideo], November 1999, <www.diarioelpais.com:82/suplementos3/elecciones99/index.phtml?noti=6>; and “Tabaré Vázquez Acusado Corrupción,” El Mercurio Electrónico [Santiago, Chile], 8 Oct. 1999. 

¹⁰⁹  “Socialist Concedes Uruguay's Presidential Race To Ruling Party,” AP, 28 November 1999; Clifford Krauss, “Governing Party Candidate Wins Presidency in Uruguay,” New York Times, 29 November 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/americas/112999uruguay-vote.html> 

¹¹⁰  CIA, World Factbook, Uruguay [1999] <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/uy.html>