Mexico and the World
Vol. 2, No 4 (Fall 1997)
http://www.profmex.org/mexicoandtheworld/volume2/4fall97/afterword.html
On Studying World
Regions
and
a Case Study of
'Greater Mexican Los Angeles-Tijuana (Real and Virtual)'
By James W. Wilkie (PROFMEX and UCLA)
This article examines how cities and
regions have been studied:
(1) by contributors to Integrating Cities and Regions;
(2) by others;
as well as about how other cities
and regions will need to be studied in Southern California and Northern
Baja California:
(3) the “Cyber-Ports Region”;
(4) the Virtual Region of “Mexican Los
Angeles-Tijuana”;
and other emerging areas such as
(5) the Pacific Rim, which is a logical outgrowth of this present
book.
◊
With regard to our studies, we have followed the approach that
I outlined in Vancouver on September 29, 1995, at a planning meeting
for this volume:
Our volume, Integrating Cities and Regions: North America
Faces Globalization, is intended to select and define the ways in which sub-national
areas capitalize on free trade and capital mobility to develop healthy
regional self-identification. The benefits of the new global economy
can only come if areas prosper below the national level. Thus it is
our task to examine how regional and local level benefits are distributed
within nations as liberalization and interdependence proceed. As Alan Alexandroff has suggested in our planning meetings,
the sub-national units selected for investigation show varied results.
Our findings suggest
that some sub-national regions have succeeded in becoming competitive
in the new global economy (Silicon Valley, Cascadia) because they
have “invented” a self-image accepted by the world. Some
areas face dire problems in maintaining their position in the global
economy (such as New York City) because they have not kept up with
infrastructural investment. Other areas (such
as San Diego-Tijuana and Arizona-Sonora) are still in the process
in formulating a self-image because they have not yet won the relatively
free cross-border travel that Cascadia enjoys).
Other areas face new
challenges that complicate their futures (Mexico City, Oaxaca, Newfoundland)
because of reductions in central government spending funding as the
national-state shrinks in importance and reduces transfers to regions.
Finally, all sub-national
regions will face the same
challenge as the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) already faces as it seeks
at the ‘city-region’ level to maintain its world-class
status. The challenge is that of accommodating,
on the one hand, integration and growing interdependence of the core
and its surrounding regions; and on the other hand, struggle between
the surrounding areas and the core over shares in policymaking concerning
tax collections and expenditure on infrastructural investment, transportation, education,
social welfare, and public services.
Alexandroff's
case of GTA illustrates, as he notes in his chapter above, the problem
faced by all politicians as they seek to assure that the core continue
to remain economically, fiscally, and culturally healthy while at
the same time cede local development autonomy and identity to the
surrounding places (in the GTA case to Durham, York, Peel, and Halton)
that have given the entire region world-class status. The long-run
problem such regions face is that the region’s name may subsume
surrounding regions in it (‘Toronto’
in the case of GTA) and each of those areas may themselves want to
propagate their own fame. Toronto may well have benefited from the
use of a neutral name
(as has “Cascadia”) or hyphenated names (as is being attempted
by “Arizona-Sonora.”)
◊◊
Two recent books have examined implicitly the creation of neutral
names to help solve the problem of creating a dominant identity eventually
resented by the parts of the whole. The first is by Delamaide and the second is by Arroyo.
In The New Superregions of Europe (1994), Darrell Delamaide sees Europe’s existing nation-states
divided into the following 10 ‘post-national’ regions:
Includes Spain except for its northwest corner,
southern Portugal, southern France, Italy except for its Alps in
the north and its Adriatic region in the south.
Includes all of Sweden, Finland, and the coastal
area from Russia’s Saint Petersburg through all of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania to the Baltic coastal regions of Poland, coastal
Germany up to Hamburg, and the eastern half of Denmark, and the corner of Norway east of Oslo.
Includes Great Britain, Ireland,
northern Portugal, northwestern Spain, coastal France, coastal Belgium,
coastal Netherlands, coastal Germany to Hamburg, Denmark’s North Sea coast, and through the center of
Jutland north through Oslo and along the Norwegian-Swedish border.
Is the rich industrial heartland and most powerful
of the superregions; it includes all of Germany from Hamburg to
Munich, most of Belgium and the Netherlands, Luxembourg, northern
and central France, the northwestern corner of Switzerland, the
Czech Republic, and western Poland.
Includes four cities. Brussels and Luxembourg are
home of the main European Union institutions; Strassbourg is home of the Council of
Europe; Paris is the cultural capital of Europe.
Is the City of London’s Square Mile that constitutes
the heart of Europe’s banking, financial markets, insurance,
and ancillary services.
Includes the Alpine regions of France, most of Switzerland,
western Austria, a corner of Italy down to Milan, and a corner of
Germany up to Munich.
Includes the tip of Bavaria east of Munich, eastern
Austria including Slovakia, all of Hungary and Romania, the former
Soviet Republic of Moldova, the new republics of Slovenia and Croatia,
and the Adriatic coast of northern Italy as far as Milan. (Often
called “East-Central Europe.)
Includes Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia
in the south of the former Yugoslavia, all of Albania and Greece,
southern Bulgaria, the tiny bit of Turkey in Europe.
Includes Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia
west of the Ural mountains, as well as the part of Poland east of
Warsaw.
Delamaide theorizes that the superregions
represent post-nationalism because even as the European Union gains
force, it is breaking into the component parts of Europe, each of
which has a history that long pre-dates the nation-state. These regions,
he says, are at once pursuing the interests in a more integrated Europe
even as they recombine across old national border to form these 10
superregions.
A very different kind of work that examines in practical terms
the use of neutral names of regions is that of Jesús Alejandro
Arroyo, ed.,
Regiones en Transición:
Ensayos sobre Integración regional de Alemania del Este y el
Occidente de México (1995). Arroyo points out that both of
these cases have a one-sided dependence. The German state of Brandenburg
is subsumed under the strong role of Berlin; and Western Mexico is
subsumed under the leading role of Guadalajara. Thus Arroyo writes:
As a result, the rural periphery in
both these macro-regions continues to diminish in population and economic
importance while the congested core areas and their surroundings sprawl
into the countryside, creating all manner of ecological, social, and
infrastructural problems.Although
Berlin and Guadalajara are so overwhelming that they become the undisputed
center of their region, they face the superregions of the European
Union and NAFTA as follows, according to Arroyo:
Both regions are involved in consolidating
a market economy. Western Mexico and Brandenburg have incomplete markets,
oligopolies, and monopolies, just as they have a tradition of state
economic interventionism in regional and urban planning; and both
regions lack a centralized ability to take their own decisions, the
problem being worse in Mexico than in Germany. The dilemma for the
central government is whether to decentralize or centralize, increase
or not the degree of regional autonomy and control in the context
wherein the regions attempt to reach endogenous growth by capitalizing
on their international comparative advantages.
Both Brandenburg and Western Mexico
are undergoing de-industrialization, Arroyo notes. In Germany the
cause stems from the fact that East Germany’s industrial plant
has been rendered obsolete by reunification of the country. In Western
Mexico, the de-industrialization is caused by Mexico’s commercial
opening as part of the NAFTA agreement, much small and medium-size
industry being too inefficiently capitalized and organized to be able
to remain in business.
Regardless of neutrality for the regional name in these cases
from East Germany and Western Mexico, the regions face tension with
the superregional powers under which they live, be it the European
Union or NAFTA. Both
Delamaide and Arroyo would seem to agree that the ability of new post-national
regions to capitalize on new economic circumstances will depend upon
the ability of regional leaders and local citizens to transcend the
ideologies of national sovereignty and the hierarchical world of nation-state.
Although at first glance analysts might assume that as archetype
of centralization French leaders would be opposed to the rise of superregions
that will dilute the importance of Paris, it is the leaders of France
who have provided the main intellectual framework for European integration.
Perhaps they realize well that as cultural capital of the European
Union, French thought will influence not only the grand concept but
the administrative style that will see the French regions provide
active leadership in the globalization process rather than passive
followership.
◊◊◊
Although in their analysis above Clark Reynolds, Serge Rey,
and others suggest the importance of the “Ventura-Ensenada Corridor”
of economic activity related to Greater Los Angeles (GLA ), and they define
it as the region that extends from Ventura (160 miles north of the
U.S. Mexican border) to Ensenada (80 miles south of the border), they
do not examine this larger region, which as yet lacks the self-identification
we required for this book. (Hence their focus on the “San Diego-Tijuana
Region.”)
The “Ventura-Ensenada Region” that is yet to be,
however, should attract our attention at least briefly because the
area will one day become one giant urban network. If its future leaders successfully construct an image of self-identification,
they will first need to give their region a name. Ideally the name
will carry an economic image that will set it apart from the rest
of the world and itself help to create economic growth.
Such a name for this area (encompassing Ensenada-Tijuana-San
Diego-Los Angeles-Ventura), in my view, should be:
“Cyber-Ports
Region”
which is cyber and high-tech based
in two kinds of communications--sea/air and computer/multimedia industries.
Cyber-Ports is the only area of the world that can boast four
harbors: one in Los Angeles and one in Long Beach (which are the top
two U.S. container ports and when combined constitute the world’s
third largest container facility),
one in San Diego (which is opening as the U.S. Navy downsizes), and
Ensenada (which must be redredged and rebuilt once a rail line is
opened to cross the U.S. border, as South Korea has proposed).
Also, the “Cyber-Ports” region boasts four major
air hubs: LAX (the second busiest airport in the USA, third in the
world), Ontario International Airport, San Diego International Airport, and Tijuana International Airport.
(A fifth international airport may emerge in Orange County at either
the John Wayne Airport or the proposed El Toro Airport at the former
U.S. Marine Air Station.) By 1998 export-related jobs contribute 850
thousand jobs to the Greater Los Angeles Area, 14 percent of all jobs,
including 253 thousand employed in tourism and service related exports,
200,000 manufacturing jobs related direction to exports, and 400,000
indirectly.
The “Ports” concept includes the alternative names
“Tech Coast” and “Multi-Media Capital of the World,” both based on the “computer port.”
The name Tech Coast concept encompasses
the 19,000 high-tech businesses, which need to create a regional identity
that can compete with Silicon Valley. This Southern California region,
which encompasses 41,000 sq. miles and over 400,000 technology workers,
includes:
1. Santa Barbara’s “Silicon Beach”;
2. 101 Tech Corridor (straddling the 101 Freeway
linking Ventura and San Fernando Valley);
3. L.A.’s “Digital Coast” (web,
satellite, and special effects design);
4. Orange County “Medical Empire” (U.S.
Food and Drug Administration Regional Office and Irvine Spectrum
5000-acre campus);
5. San Diego’s “Wireless Valley”
(telecommunications and biotechnology);
6. “Inland Empire” (agricultural
technology, mapping, and state-of-the-art industry capitalizing on
the area’s ten universities from Pomona to Redlands).
To this list we should add Tijuana
and Ensenada’s “Silicon Valley South,” both of which
are contributing to the maquila export-industry boom that is underway
across the border from San Diego, aided by the Universidad Autónoma
de Baja California.
◊◊◊◊
Co-existing with the above Cyber-Ports Region is what I call
here “Mexican Los Angeles,” which is directly
linked to Tijuana, from where many legal and illegal workers commute
to work. Many Mexicans who cross the border daily have never been
able to feel at ease with the “Americanist Culture” of
San Diego, a culture that too often seemingly despises “illegals”
and is suspicious of persons on the basis of their skin color. San Diego’s Americanists, perhaps reinforced by the U.S.
Navy mentality that requires maintenance of discipline, has demanded that the USA control its border. Thus, some “Americanist
vigilantes” patrol the U.S. side of the border to “catch
illegal crossers”; others park at the U.S. line en masse and
use their car headlamps to “Light Up the Border,” thus
discouraging illegals from even attempting to cross. To avoid this
culture, many Mexicans from Tijuana simply skirt San Diego to interact
with Los Angeles.
The important interactions that link Greater Los Angeles and
Tijuana have led some scholars to see GLA as the border city to Tijuana,
not San Diego. Because this region is not a geographic one in that
it omits San Diego, we can call it a virtual region. This North American
“region” that has yet to be fully identified and analyzed
is important because it is a virtual one where in land, air, and sea
bridges link Mexican Los Angeles to Tijuana. This region can be seen
from the air at night as a brilliant ribbon of car lights that bridges
the two cities. The unbroken 75-mile ribbon is U.S. Interstate Highway
5 which at Los Angeles links by land also to the U.S. Interstate Highway
405 connecting toward West L.A. Outside San Diego, this land bridge
links also to U.S. Interstate 805 that directly connects Tijuana and
Los Angeles, thus bypassing San Diego.
Because in the above chapter on San Diego and Tijuana, Serge Rey and others portray the mutual self-identification
of those two cities based upon their complex interchange, they do
not mention the fact that the U.S. 805 bypass of San Diego shows us
that for much of the population in Tijuana the real border city is
Los Angeles. Hence the
development of a virtual region that ignores San Diego and the border,
both of which are seen as impediments to fast travel.
The 130-mile freeway between Greater Los Angeles and Tijuana
is more than a U.S. Interstate Highway, it is the corridor of international
transportation for
(1) Mexican
legal and “undocumented” laborers who work in Los Angeles and live in Tijuana;
(2) Mexican family members seeking to be with their
loved ones who reside in one city or the other;
(3) exporters and importers who shuttle (alongside
trucks loaded with goods) between Los Angeles and Tijuana, especially
to and from Maquila plants;
(4) investors, consultants, and business and industrial
managers who commute between the two cities;
(5) U.S. tourists who seek a one-day visit to “Old Mexico”;
(6) U.S. citizens who seek alternative medicine,
usually not yet approved for use in the USA;
(7) U.S. teenagers who can legally drink alcohol
in Tijuana before they reach age 21 and thrill-seekers looking for
the “TJ” that is more myth than reality;
(8) international smugglers;
(9) criminals who conduct their nefarious
activities in Los Angeles and then cross the border to seek refuge
in Tijuana (or vice versa).
Tijuana is important to Mexican Los Angeles for two major reasons
that go well beyond the above eight examples: First, Tijuana has become a major air transportation hub for
Mexicans in Los Angeles who cannot afford to pay international air
fares as they go and come from their homes throughout all Mexico.
Flights from Mexico City to Tijuana often include free or inexpensive
bus travel on to Los Angeles as part of the airfare.
Second, Mexican families divided between Los Angeles and Tijuana
tend to jointly hold their fiestas in Tijuana, which they see as their
cultural refuge. It is at these gatherings that information is passed
on that creates social networks for jobs and opportunities. Tijuana
may be a “border city” but also it is a city of Mexico,
its Mexican culture constantly being replenished by persons arriving
from all over Mexico either enroute to crossing the border or to seek
work in Tijuana’s “Klondike” atmosphere.
Mexican Los Angeles is not so much a geographic area as much
as it is a spirit that penetrates all aspects of life. It is the Mexican
chef in every ethnic restaurant (be it Korean, French, Polish, “American,”
or South African, as a somewhat exaggerated joke goes). It is the three Mexican television channels, the many dozens
of video-rental stores and cinemas, the nearly two dozen radio stations,
and the circulation of Mexican newspapers. It is the Mexican landscapers
and gardeners who tend every section of the city. It is the Mexican
nannies and maids who staff the hotels and hospitals as well as the
houses of the middle and upper classes throughout Los Angeles. It
is the Mexican day-workers who wait for construction work on certain
street corners every morning to be contracted by the day and then
carried to every corner of Greater Los Angeles to do the physical work for low pay that few “Anglos” are willing to do. It is the Mexican extended family getting ahead by pooling the
earnings of all. It is the Mexican mothers and grandmothers who keep alive the big chain stores in downtown Los Angeles as they buy clothes for their many children (each woman averaging 3.5 children), who are often in arms or in tow.
Table 1
Total Population in the Year 2000 of
Grater Los Angeles (GLA) - Tijuana (T)
and the Sub-Total for Mexican Population in the
Virtual Region of Mexican Los Angeles - Tijuana (MLA+T)
(FOR THE REVISION OF THIS TABLE BY DR OLGA M. LAZÍN, SEE THE FOLLOWING LINK)
http://www.profmex.org/mexicoandtheworld/volume8/3summer03/Revising%20Wilkies%20concept.html
Category Population Millions Percent Method
A. Total Greater Los Angeles (GLA)1 16.4 89.1%
B. Total Tijuana (T) 2 2.0 10.9%
C. Total GLA+T 18.0 100.0% (C=A+B)
D. Mexican-Born Mexican in GLA3 3.2 52.5%
E. Native Born Mexican in GLA4 2.9 47.5%
F. Total Mexican Los Angeles5 6.1 100.0% (F=D+E)
G. Mexicans in Tijuana 2.0 (B)
H. Sub-Total in MLA+T 8.1 (H=F+G)
(Mexican Los Angeles-Tijuana)
I. Mexican Share of GLA+T 44.0% (I=H/C)
1. Includes the following
counties: Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura.
Excludes Mexicans and Latinos in San Diego County, which may number
up to 1 million. Data are taken from Los Angeles Economic Development
Corporation--see: <http://www.laedc.org/stat_popul.html>.
2. My estimate; the official figure
of about 1 million seems to be underestimated by 50% (depending
upon the season and economic conditions in Mexico and the USA).
3.
Extrapolating the data for 2000 as changing since 1990 at the same
rate as data for 1980 to 1990 (89% increase. Data for 1980 (.9 million) and 1990 (1.7 million) are found in Roger
Waldinger and Mehdi Borzorgmehr, eds., Ethnic Los Angeles (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996), p. 95. Data are rounded here.
4.
Extrapolating the data for 2000 as changing since 1990 at the same
rate as data for 1980to 1990. Data for 1980 (1.4 million) and 1990 (2.0 million) are found in Waldingerand Borzorgmehr, p. 95.
Data are rounded here.
5.
If extrapolations by José Angel Pescador, Mexican Consul General in Los Angeles, are correct, however, the total population of
Mexican Los Angeles is only about 4 million. This would reduce the Mexican share of GLA+T to about 34 percent.
With about 2 million Mexicans in Tijuana and perhaps 6 million
Mexicans in Greater Los Angeles (depending both on the season and
the economic situation in Mexico and the USA), I estimate that the
population in the Mexican Los Angeles-Tijuana Virtual Region totals
about 8 million. This total is about 49 percent of the population
of the Virtual Region, according to the calculations in Table 1.
The Mexican Los Angeles-Tijuana Virtual Region
will gain increasing importance is due to the fact that the growing
Central and South American population that makes up the region looks
to the Mexican Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles to
provide a place of cultural meeting. While it may seem odd to watch
Mexican Independence being celebrated by non-Mexican Latin Americans,
I have observed how groups from each country of Latin America sing
the Mexican songs at the Mexican Consulate, but also they place the
flag, art, and food of
their own country in the midst of Mexicanidad. All
the non-Mexicans present are pleased
to recognize the importance of the Mexican community in protecting
the interests of all Latin Americans, many of whom use Tijuana as
their entry and exit port to their own countries.
It is convenient for Latinos to identify with Mexicans because
many Anglos do not themselves make a distinction between Mexican Latinos
and non-Mexican Latinos. Where in 1980 Latinos constituted 28 percent
of Los Angeles County proper, by 1990 the share had increased to 38
percent. By 1997 that share reached 44 percent.
The 1997 total number of Latinos (including White and non-White Latinos) in Greater Los Angeles changed
between 1990 and 1997 as follows: 16 percent increase in Los Angeles
Country, 35 per cent in Orange County (to 761 thousand or the fifth
highest number in the USA), 36 per cent increase in San Diego County,
53 percent increase in Riverside Country, 33 percent increase in Ventura
County, 41 percent increase in Ventura County.
In the meantime, the White population (excluding Latino Whites)
fell from 71 percent in 1970 to 54 percent in 1980, 41 percent in
1990, to 34 percent in 1997.
If we take into account the fact the Tijuana is booming as
it attracts ever larger investment for export of goods to the USA,
the Mexican population will, within a few short years, constitute
more than half of the people living in the Greater Los Angeles-Tijuana
Virtual Region. The second largest city of Mexico is indeed what we
matter-of-factly call “Los Angeles.”
◊◊◊◊◊
The suggestion that in the future we need to study cities and
regions in the Pacific Rim emerged at an October 1998 Bildner Center
Policy Forum (City University of New York Graduate School). The subject of the Forum, convened by Ronald G. Hellman and
chaired by Clint E. Smith) studied the links between the Asian economic
crisis and North American regions in relation to the global economy. It was clear to analysts involved in the session, both from
the U.S. and Japan, that such research is lagging; and that in the future we should develop
a follow-up case study involving selected sub-regions in Asia (certainly
including Japan and China) as they relate to interactions with North
America.
At our forum in New York City the following questions were
raised to guide our future thinking about the development of a volume
to be entitled Integrating Pacific Rim Cities and Regions: The
Western Hemisphere and Asia Face
Globalization:
1. What has been the impact on Pacific Rim cities and regions
of the process of free trade arrangements (going back to the rise
of GATT, the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, APEC, and ASEAN
groups) and globalization?
2. What is to be learned from Japan's
role in promoting economic development through investment and assistance?
3. While the USA continues to thrive
economically, how long will it take Asian countries to make the adjustment
from closed state-controlled “crony capitalism” to open
and transparent market capitalism?
4. How can Silicon Valley best meet
the myriad challenges of severe housing shortages and overcrowded
highways as a result of the 1990s boom, and disturbing evidence of
growing income inequality, even as industry is threatened externally
by declining exports to Asia?
5. What is the future of the New York
metropolitan area in light of newly perceived environmental and ecological
problems?
6. How long will it take for Mexico
to complete (and admit) the shift from its peso-based economy of instability
to full “dollarization” that will provide economic stability? (Dollarization may already account for up to 60 percent of
Mexico’s economy.)
7. How long will it take the Mexican
government to de-link its vulnerable tax base from a "national"
and inefficiently operated petroleum industry, and to diversify its
tax base and encourage
the development of a modern, efficient petroleum industry? Without foreign private direct investment
in the industry, Mexican oil exports will be unable to compete in
a world
that where potential supply increasingly
exceeds stable or declining demand.
8. What is the impact on cities and
regions of the growing consolidation in telecommunications, banking,
and airline service?
9. To what extent are Trans Global
Companies (TGCs) emerging that
are based not in any nation or nations but in cyber-space?
10. To what extent are Virtual Free
Trade Areas (FTAs)
emerging in the Pacific Rim Area.
Proposed research topics include:
“Virtual Regions: Electronic
Multi-Media Super Corridors in Silicon Valley and Malaysia.”
Silicon Valley continues to offer a unique example of well-integrated,
region-wide coordination. It
has established a virtual electronic community throughout the Western
Hemisphere and Asia. The fruits of region-wide planning are
evident in the prosperity that has made the Silicon Valley famous,
but research on it needs to be broadened and deepened to more fully
understand the ways in which it has addressed regional challenges
at critical point to build a grassroots community combining private
and public sector entrepreneurship.
In the meantime , Malaysia’s
drive to establish a Super Corridor has been damaged by, first, the
country’s economic collapse in 1997 when its crony capitalists
found themselves overextended financially; and, second, the country’s
withdrawal from the world market that had made it rich. Research also
is now needed to determine to what extent the 1998 break between Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad and his former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim has set back the country’s modernization.
“Geo-Political Economic Regions
in the Philippines:
From The Old U.S. Bases at Clark and Subic to Development of New U.S. Bases in the Sulu Sea Area.”
Philippine non-renewal in 1991 of the leases for
U.S. bases had two disastrous results that offset the nationalistic
pride won by the country. First, the U.S. departure
has severely hurt the economy of the Philippines (throwing 80,000
people out of work as well as reducing every kind of U.S. help that
the country was used to receiving). Second it affected the country's geo-political situation.
Although the closure of Clark and Subic ceremonially marked the Philippines’
elimination of the military power base of its former colonial master,
subsequently it has generated calls for inviting the U.S. to build
new bases not only to develop a new region but also to gain U.S. backing
as Philippine Republic stakes its claim to a large share of the Spratley
Islands, which apparently have large oil reserves. Given Philippine weakness, the U.S. bases would help to counterbalance
the counter-claims on the same territory made by China, Vietnam, Malaysia,
and Taiwan.
The government is considering how
to permit the USA to establish a new base at General Santos City on
the southernmost tip of Mindanao Island. This city is situated at the top of a large sheltered bay that
can accommodate aircraft carriers and guided missile cruisers. It is out of the area of the typhoon belt
and all volcanoes. Development
of the $110 million facilities is being financed by the U.S. Agency
for International Development.
“Singapore Vs China’s
‘New’ Hong Kong.”
Research is needed to provide insight into China’s view
on globalization as it incorporates the Hong Kong economy. Not only do we need to examine the competition between Beijing
and Hong Kong for economic power but also to understand the competition
between Hong Kong and Singapore.
China’s incorporation of Hong Kong in1997 has been Singapore’s
gain. Indeed suspicion that the Communist government has ended Hong
Kong’s legendary free market is seen by many to have come with
the government 1998 manipulation of the stock exchange to ‘protect’
the Hong Kong dollar against ‘speculators.” Singapore sees itself as having gained the edge in competing
with Hong Kong, especially because Hong Kong transparency has ended
as its own data is now reported as part of the China data, famously
rigged.
“The BeSeTo (Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo)
Beltway. ”Greater Seoul and Greater Tokyo Compete to Become
the Northeastern Hub of Asia and Gateway to China.”
With Greater Seoul seeking to become the hub city in Northeast
Asia, research is needed to cover: 1) the globalization and restructuring
of Korea: 2) trade and investment flows; 3) cultural exchanges in
Northeast Asia; and 4) China’s limitations on direct U.S.
commercial air access have led to Seoul and Tokyo competing as the
U.S. gateway to China. But Japan also has hurt itself by limiting
U.S. flights and refusing to fully embrace the policy of “open
skies” pushed by the USA. The 1998 limited opening by Japan,
which permits Federal Express greater access to Tokyo and on through
to Asia, promises to
open the way for increased passenger communication via Tokyo to the
rest of Asia, including Seoul and Beijing.
As in so many types of economic activity, if Japan does not
open, Seoul stands to gain; and the Japanese government seems paralyzed
amidst the country’s long-term economic slowdown. In the meantime,
research is also needed on China’s 1998 decision to withdraw
its immediate application for admission to the World Trade Organization.
◊◊◊ ◊◊◊
In conclusion, let me note that this book addresses problems
and issues that should be part of our future research agenda, as should
the comparison of geographic regions which face the same problems
regardless of the superregion in which they exist. The editors look
forward, along with colleagues from many countries, to continuing
their work in this emerging field.
At our New York
City forum concern emerged that research is lagging because there
is a shortage of private-sector policymakers as well as national
state, and local governmental leaders who are concerned with global
issues. Not only do we need to consider how policymakers can best
be informed of rapid changes in the world, but we also need to develop
successor generations of academically trained policy analysts to
improve their capacity as public and private sector policymakers.
Further, there is urgent need to develop globally-oriented policy
research institutions such as PROFMEX, the Bildner Center, and the
University of Guadalajara to at once strengthen and find expanded
funds necessary to advance independent research on the Trans Global
Economy.
For theory about
and definition of TGCs, see James W. Wilkie,
“Fast-Track Globalization
and the Rise of Virtual
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