THE POLITICAL NETWORK IN MEXICO: Between Conflict and Stability

by

 Samuel Schmidt

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science

University of Texas at El Paso

El Paso, TX 79968.

fax (915) 747 5400 . E-mail: [email protected]

Jorge Gil Mendieta

Instituto de Investigaciones en Matemáticas Aplicadas y en Sistemas,

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, (IIMAS-UNAM)

Ap. Postal 20-763,

Mexico, D.F. CP 01000. México

fax (525) 550-2189. Internet: [email protected]

I. INTRODUCTION*

Political stability in Mexico has amazed scholars and politicians around the globe in that, after the assassination of their presidential candidate in 1994, the PRI was able to win the election and secure a peaceful presidential succession. For answers, some look into the corporatist system, others into the power structure of the party and still others into the controls of the media. While there is agreement that consensus is a key element to understanding Mexico's political stability (Newell and Rubio 1984), we still have to ascertain what creates this consensus.

This long-lasting history of political stability can be best understood by recognizing the existence of a cohesive network of power which controls conflict and the major political processes. Camp (1980), Centeno (1994) look into the factors that shaped the Mexican political elite, in some cases creating directories or looking for formal relations. Although some of these relations are important, such as identifying the university where most of the political elite is recruited from, many of these authors lead us to assume that some rationale develops from attending the same school, and in some cases this is true, but in others, we must go beyond ply statistical data in order to understand how coincidence in one school forges the bonds that develop into political groups. The coincidence of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (i) , Manuel Mu–noz Rocha, Hugo Andrés Araujo, Jaime De la Mora in the College of Engineering at UNAM (1965-1969) was the base for the creation of a group that controlled both the government office in charge of rural development and the peasants representation during the 80s and 90s, and probably will explain conflicts in regions where they intervened, including the Antorcha Campesina group in Puebla and the Chiapas revolt.

Here we argue that different forces compete for power even though the president wields the greatest amount of it. Until the late 1980s this competition functioned within a system of discipline and loyalty, where the interests of two sub-networks could be accommodated. Ideological and political competition was controlled and contained by the president until the moment when the system was disrupted by forces unwilling to accept an ideological consensus within the PRI. This destroyed the PRI's longstanding cohesion and created a scenario for political violence which resulted in widespread killing of political activists in 1988-1994 (Partido de la Revolución Democrática 1992, America's Watch 1990) and the assassination of two PRI leaders in 1994.

The split within the PRI in 1988 and the "Cádenas phenomenon" can be conceptualized as increased resistance by the displaced revolutionary military sub-network against the continuation of the financiers(ii) in power, and the fundamental disagreement between the two sub-networks. The 1988 election showed a previously unified network in open and conflictive competition. This confrontation became irreconcilable, the old consensus was severely damaged, and a new arrangement emerged with a new political party pitted squarely against the ruling elite, yet stability prevailed.

In this essay we look into the development of the network of power to understand the concentration of power, since the "most powerful actors are the incumbents simultaneously holding key positions within both webs of formal and informal relations to other organization participants" (Knoke 1990: 93). We also look into prominence, which is a function of the centrality of other persons to whom one is connected (73).

In our research we explain the creation and development of this network using information on personal and institutional participation. Our analysis is based on ethnography, graph theory, and data banks on the Mexican political elite (Hernández 1975, Smith 1975, Ruiz Massieu and Flores Maldonado 1988, Camp 1990, 1984, 1980, Gil, Schmidt and Castro 1993, Diccionario Biográfico del Gobierno Mexicano [1988-1994]), and autobiographies (Alemán 1986, Santos 1984). The information supporting this analysis is kept at REDMEX, a data base developed by the authors at Laboratorio de Gráficas housed at the Institute for Applied Mathematics (IIMASS) located at the UNAM, which presently contains about 5,400 entries detailing personal and political information on members of the Mexican government, including the executive, legislative (congress and senate), and judicial branches as well as officials of government-owned corporations and state governors. Each computer registry contains sixteen indicators such as personal information (age, parents, spouse), education, political activities (political party membership), membership in social groups (e. g., labor unions, peasant organizations) elected positions, congressional positions, government positions, professional activities, academic positions, publications, membership in professional groups (e. g., Mexican Association of Computing), awards and decorations, international representations, and commissions (mostly refers to the military).

II. THE TWO SUB-NETWORKS

A network is formed by pairs of nodes interconnected by links representing formal, informal and organizational relationships. The architecture of a network shows the flow of information and pattern of relations. Networks can be more or less centralized, and network analysis helps identify the cliques, number of connections and groups. A network can contain a set of sub-networks. Each sub-network is the representation of points of coincidence and common belonging (school, sports, business, political participation) or a common interest (political power).

A sub-network contains a set of groups. We can partition a group into specific elements of participation in different activities such as political groups, family relationships, school, religion. The group's bonding creates a distinctive sense of belonging which impacts the nature of the network.

The influence individuals have within the network is determined by their centrality, which results from participation, simultaneously or over time, in various groups. Individuals who participate in various groups have more influence because they control more resources or are able to mobilize resources of other members in the network. If actors are placed at the intersection of groups their influence may be considerable, because they become a central node connecting different resource mobilization capabilities (Schmidt and Gil 1995 and Gil and Schmidt 1996).

The Mexican network is a superimposition of networks where an actor can participate simultaneously in various networks. Figure 1 shows the hypothetical case where one politician belongs to four different networks.

There is agreement in the literature about the existence of the network. Scholars frequently recognize the existence of a "revolutionary family" (iii) consisting of a governing elite devoted to the revolutionary past, present and future, based on friendship established on the battlefield, in sports, in governmental offices, schools, institutes and universities, Masonic lodges, the business community, and marriages. It shares an interest in accruing and holding power, prestige and wealth, fear of political defeat and anti-revolutionaries gaining power. It functions with the inertia of being part of a mechanism operating to maintain the status quo and not disturb the revolutionary arrangement. It is also tagged the "Revolutionary Coalition" (Padgett 1976, Hansen 1974) or "Revolutionary Cohort and Post-revolutionary Cohort of Officials" (Smith l979). The later acknowledges the difference between politicians and técnicos. Along these lines Centeno (1994) elaborates on similar categories.

The preceding analyses show that a structure of power does exist in the Mexican political system, even though we may not concur on an explanation of how the revolutionary family works or how it reaches agreement. Alvarez (1982) suggests the existence of a political agreement between four groups identified with the revolutionary generals Carranza, Obregón, Calles, and Cárdenas for rotating the presidency every 24 years. The explanation is very appealing but leaves many questions unanswered. Moreover, most analyses fail to identify the structure of the network.

The analysis of the Mexican network of power facilitates the understanding of political arrangements, coalition building, the way equipos and camarillas are interconnected and the impact of the foregoing on governability and political stability. The Mexican president is considered the central node in the network. Formal and informal connections with him happen through appointed officials and members of political groups. Political groups or camarillas/"coteries" are relevant (Camp 1992, 1990). The camarilla is a "cluster of ambitious politicians" headed by a top personality in the political hierarchy (Camp 1992: 19), and equipos, which are a cohesive cluster of followers, develop as part of groups.

The network sprang from the revolutionary army (Alvarez 1982, Hall 1981, Aguilar Camin and Meyer 1989) and developed through social, economic and political interactions such as participation in the revolutionary army, groups of university students, family, business and kinship relationships, political party, federal bureaucracy, school, etc.

It is possible to speak figuratively about two armies. One is the revolutionary army, whose leaders started as civilians and through armed actions were quickly promoted to the top ranks. Obregón, Cárdenas and Calles became generals in only a few years. At the end of the revolution military leaders became political leaders and sought to acquire political rather than military power.

The other army emerged from political stability and professionalism (Carriedo 1992, Camp 1992), and promotions were obtained by going to the academy (Camp 1980). The Mexican army has a well-defined promotion process and established hierarchies without political interference(iv) but they hold elected and appointed positions.

The military have had a systemic function: internal security. They consummated the revolution, pacified the country and maintained domestic peace and security in accordance with circumstantial repression (v )(among other instances, repressing student protest in 1968 and the fight against guerrillas in Guerrero in the 1970s). Moreover, the army has played a leading role vis-ˆ-vis the civil society in the war against drugs, gun control and disaster relief. Repressing dissidence and pacifying conflicts have been a fundamental factor for the stability of civilian governments. However, they are loosing their political influence.

The revolutionary leaders transferred some of the most important military values to the political system: discipline, loyalty and respect for hierarchy. The revolution became their source of identity and of network connections. When they controlled political power they transferred "revolutionary" values to the government, and this became the rationale to create and consolidate the network.

From this leadership emerged a mythical and rhetorical model that prevails to this day. The military elite was transformed into a political network through alliances established in the revolutionary struggle and based on regional sources of economic, military and political power. It was responsible for the transition from military to civilian power (Hall 1981), consolidating a new regime and a new political system. Their geographic origin helped them control economic regions, such as the agriculturally rich state of Sonora by Obregón and Calles, Michoacán(vi) by Cárdenas, and Puebla by Avila Camacho. Based on this model the network guaranteed peace and political stability, which has involved orderly presidential successions since 1934. The network had a centralized architecture which created some tensions in the system because it concentrated competition inside the network while at the same time minimizing instability by eliminating uncontrolled external political competition. Internal cohesion helped the government to consolidate against the challenge of political pressure from without. The 1988 presidential election, which is considered by many as a watershed, was peaceful but without discipline. Network analysis shows that presidential succession responds to long-lasting linkages.

The military combine their systemic function with political positions achieved through the network, thus maintaining a discreet but constant presence in politics without vaunting their power. This presence includes their election, as members of the PRI, to political positions such as governorships, congressional and senate seats, or appointments to public office. Nevertheless, until 1970 their influence was greater when presidential nomination occurred.

The network expands, constantly increasing its political power in formal connections, such as participation in bureaucratic positions, and informal connections, such as participation in political positions. The combination of old and new connections creates political stability, which in turn increases institutional growth and the network's power. The two sub-networks split up

The two competing sub-networks have a common origin in the revolutionary armed forces (Schmidt and Gil 1991), creating and controlling political institutions. The first members created military linkages which evolved into participation in political institutions and government. The politicians who controlled political institutions, including the ruling party, labor and peasant groups and other representative institutions, and who were in control of the specialized function of political control created a sub-network whom we shall call the politicos.

The second sub-network sprang from the original network, specializing in the government's financial sector, where it became entrenched. It had its first important participation in the Miguel Alemán administration (1940-1946) and kept control of the main financial institutions, notably the Bank of Mexico, the treasury department, and the allocation of federal expenditures (vii) . Members of this sub-network resemble what the literature defines as technocrats. They give great importance to their prior academic background and prefer technical solutions in solving political problems, but they have had political ambition and competed for power within the PRI. Camp (1983) calls them political technocrats; Smith (l979) uses the term "post-revolutionary cohort of officials," Centeno (1994) labels them technocrats, Schmidt (1991) dubs them bureaucratic presidents and we call them financiers. They are different from the typical technocrat in that they were partners in government, had connections with the military leadership, specialized in a systemic function, competed for power, gained the presidency, now control the system and have ruled since 1982. The competition for power between politicos and financiers always happened following the network's written and unwritten rules, avoiding conflict between them. The main goal has been a peaceful and controlled presidential succession requiring loyalty and discipline from competing actors. The achievement of these values shows the merit of the network and helps explain the network's role for Mexico's political stability.

III. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

Peaceful presidential successions,--where the members of the network, whether winners or losers, accept the outcome--, can be a clue to explaining Mexico's enduring political stability.

The naming of the PRI's presidential candidate is hidden from the average citizen, so Mexicans firmly believe that the selection of the next president is made by a higher power. The pre-candidate is waiting tapado/veiled (viii) for the power to unveil and appoint him as candidate for a post which he will undoubtedly win. The "unveiling" has been designated as the dedazo/being "selected," implying the higher power's finger pointing at the "chosen one" ( ix ).

This system of transfer of power is based on the president's being the central node in the network, and most politicians are loyal and obedient to him. From him derive the power to further or to destroy political careers and the direction for all political activities (x ). Most analysts and politicians believe the Mexican president is omnipotent, his power based in legal sources (Carpizo 1977) or in indebted politicians, as the powers of the president to select officials extend from his successor, senators, congresspersons and governors, down to the municipal level (Hansen 1974). Therefore, people see no reason to question his power to designate the presidential candidate. As a consequence, elections are perceived as irrelevant and a futile rite (xi)(Beezley 1985, Aguilar Camin and Meyer 1989), since the result has been assured beforehand. However, elections help expand network connections, and the campaign manager creates new coalitions and political alliances for the next presidential succession.

Although since 1988 a fissure has developed in the network, presidential succession is still important for understanding the principles and values of the power structure in the country. Nevertheless, the nomination process has been one of the best kept secrets, and we have mere speculation on how each candidate was selected. Different explanations include the incumbent president designating his successor (Cosio Villegas 1974); former presidents having a certain veto capacity( xii); an inner circle of the "Revolutionary Coalition" consulted by the President (Hansen 1974); certain conditions are required to be designated (Padgett 1976; Camp 1984) (xiii) ; allegiance to the incumbent's political project (Zarate 1995).

The perception of presidential concentration of power has inspired the image of a pyramid (Hansen 1974, Padgett 1976). Schmidt's (1992) graphic view of Mexican corporatism shows the president as the only one with power and the other actors with influence. But it is difficult to accept that the incumbent president, all by himself, designates his successor (xiv). This argument implies that all political forces are subject to the president's whim and are irrelevant to this most crucial political decision.

Historical events challenge the perception of the president's absolute control of presidential succession. This is the case of the autonomy developed by the new president, who in some cases starts as the candidate distancing himself from the incumbent. Some relevant cases include Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-46) opposing Lázaro Cárdenas, Luis Echeverría (1970-76) opposing Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, Jose López Portillo (1976-82) opposing Echeverría and Colosio's (1994) early opposition to Carlos Salinas as candidate. This, in fact, has been one of the reasons to blame the assassination on Salinas.

Some scholars consider that the President designates his successor to balance the system (ideology included) and compensate excesses perpetrated in his administration. Others consider the selection is made according to the condition of the country (Ramírez in Zarate 1995). This assumption supported the pendulum theory (Needler 1971, Skidmore and Smith 1984), where presidents fluctuate between left and right in a pendulum movement balancing deviations (xv). Regardless of the type and degree of autonomy, the network keeps control of the system.

Groups and camarillas compete for power within the network, but it is unclear what role they play in the designation of the presidential candidate. We assume that powerful cliques can influence political decisions, and their existence elicits various questions which have gone unanswered: Who forms these groups? How are they created? Do all groups follow the same pattern? What are their political articulation patterns? And last but not least, how do they influence presidential succession?

Network analysis helps address some of these questions, providing an instrument to analyze political connections which influence presidential succession. It helps define political clusters, discover who are the most influential actors in the network and the clusters where more power is concentrated. The clique formed by Miguel Alemán, Antonio Carrillo Flores, Antonio Ortiz Mena, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and Hugo B. Margain had a strong influence on the financial sector of government: three were secretaries of the treasury, and two were presidents (see Table 1).

IV. THE NETWORK AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSIONS

Since 1920 each presidential succession has had its own peculiarity, the constant being belonging to the network. Network connections may be of a different nature in each case. In the López Portillo selection, president Echeverría could have chosen a friend from his youth (Smith 1979). In Echeverría's, the President could have consulted former presidents or, as in Ruiz Cortines's, the incumbent could have attempted to prolong his own power (Camp 1990) to succumb to an imposition by the network (Gil, Schmidt and Castro 1993).

There are similarities in some of the selections, but apart from generalities, it is difficult to identify key patterns relevant to the candidate's nomination. In the eleven presidential successions from 1934 to 1994, all candidates were secretaries in the presidential cabinet during the preceding administration. Four were Secretaries of Gobernación, three Secretaries of Budget and Planning, two Secretaries of War, one Secretary of Finance, one Secretary of Labor and one Secretary of Social Development. Statistically, this distribution suggests that the Secretary of the Gobernación has the highest probability to become president, but this conclusion is inaccurate because the nomination is based on the political context, as could have been the selection of López Mateos during a period of labor turbulence, since he was Secretary of Labor; or, De la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo(xvi ) moving from the Department of Budget at and Planning at a time of financial instability.

Network connections are an important component for the presidential selection as we can learn from Alemán's succession. The politicians most mentioned at the time to succeed him were those with the highest number of connections with the central node (see table 2), which included Ramos Millán (6 connections); De la Selva and Soto Máynez (5 connections); Casas Alemán, López Sánchez, Ortiz Mena and Ramírez (4 connections). Alemán's successor, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, was a politician with fewer connections. He had two connections with Alemán because he served in his administration in Veracruz and the presidential cabinet, but he did not participate in other subgroups in Alemán's group. Instead, he had strong network connections. He was an army officer, was supported by Generals Miguel Henriquez, Gonzalo N. Santos and Cándido Aguilar, the later was Alemán's mentor. Henriquez and Aguilar ran as opposition candidates to force a concession to the army.

The constant in the presidential succession is that the candidate had network connections. On many occasions those were expanded during his predecessor's presidential campaign, especially when the candidate was campaign manager, but invariably he must have been in the presidential cabinet (Ruiz Massieu and Flores Maldonado 1988) (xvii) . Thus, the role of the cabinet is of the highest importance because it is also the main source of political stability and control. In the cabinet, political groups compete for the presidency and network connections consolidate.

V. THE CABINET

It is important to analyze the presidential cabinet to understand presidential succession because presidential candidates emerge from the cabinet, which seems to be an instrument the president manipulates to balance political groups (Smith 1979).

Even though not all secretaries are "the president's men," presidential succession creates movement in the government and a new balance of forces (Figure 2). Members of the cabinet belong to different camarillas, including the previous president's camarilla, which challenges the idea that former presidents do not intervene in politics (xviii). Thus, presidential succession involves a balance of camarillas and groups in and out of the cabinet, which is reflected in the cabinet's composition. Within the pyramidal conception of the Mexican political system, a Secretary in the cabinet is the head of a camarilla with a group head above him, and the latter is part of a sub-network.

Groups are more influential than is commonly believed, because they articulate loyalty and allegiance. Even with a centralized political system the president can not handle them at will. "The personal obligations, loyalties, affections, and trust that people have within their social networks exert powerful, persuasive influences" (Knoke 1990: 35). The group and the camarilla are negotiating units and a support group for their members.

If Alvarez's (1982) explanation of the rotating groups is correct, some questions remain unanswered: How does the selection mechanism work? Who decides who is the successor? How is compliance with the rotation assured? Who at the present time leads the respective groups to decide who will be the next president? Who includes the candidate in the presidential cabinet? How are all groups articulated?

The network is an articulation system comprising various levels of participation combined to assure continuity and stability for the political system. In it, individuals associate and promote themselves around a common interest: the maintenance of political power. The Zedillo (1994-) case is enlightening. He lacks a camarilla, but when he was nominated, Carlos Hank, the powerful politician from the state of Mexico, mobilized his group to help him. Zedillo appointed some of the members of this group to key positions in the party, including the presidency and electoral action. Later on, he appointed another member of the group to Secretary of Gobernación. When Zedillo was unable to handle conflict with Salinas, former president Echeverría came to his rescue. The network intervened to save Zedillo and the political system.

The presidential cabinet is one of the political system's equilibrium instruments, but control of presidential succession is the key to holding the system together. This is why the president's power is based in his ability to balance all forces and groups, and this is assured by network connections. To secure peace and political stability the president rewards and punishes politicians, allocating resources and political positions.

VI. THE SUCCESSION OF BOTH SUB-NETWORKS IN POWER

The original network created a system of identity and loyalty which became the basis for cohesion, the continuation of a revolutionary myth, and a stable system of political power. The network can adapt to political change through institutional change and the manipulation of central and regional powers. Based on presidential power, different groups consolidated regionally. This is the case of the Alemán(xix) and Cárdenas groups (Camp 1990), which developed from both politicians' groups. Both groups competed for the presidency in the 1940s and 1950s (Hernández 1991, Santos 1984) and their competition continued over the years until 1988, when an ideological dispute provoked a major split in the PRI (Schmidt and Gil 1991).

The historical description and computer analysis of relations (Gil and Schmidt 1996) in the network coincide in pointing to the existence of two main sub-networks. One kept the connections with the revolutionary military leadership, and the other specialized in financial control of the government, developing a new set of connections. Both sub-networks competed peacefully for power with a strong sense of discipline, ensuring the stability of the political system for many decades. This arrangement eliminated internal conflict, which is the main reason why the network has been able to quell social and political strife such as peasant unrest, teacher's conflict, student uprisings and even guerrilla movements with such a high degree of success.

VI.1. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION WITH MILITARY INFLUENCE

The network developed from the core of generals known as the Sonora group (Aguilar Camin and Meyer 1989), who consummated the revolution and led the process of stabilization of political power. Alvaro Obregón (1920-1924) is recognized as the head of the group. The next president, Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-1928), was Obregón's presidential campaign manager and Secretary of Gobernación in his cabinet. Calles had connections with Carranza, Madero and Ortiz Rubio

Emilio Portes Gil (1928-1930), a member of the Obregón group was chosen to balance the political groups when Obregón was assassinated. He developed his political career along two parallel tracks: the military--where he was Assistant Chief of the Army's Justice Department and Counsel for the Ministry of War and Navy--; and the judiciary,--as Judge and Magistrate of the Superior Court of Justice in Sonora in 1916--, where he made contacts with members of the Sonora Group. He was a three-time congressman, twice governor of Tamaulipas and Secretary of Gobernación. Network relations expanded in the state and especially Tampico, an important oil center because top military personalities, such as Cárdenas and Alemán Sr. were stationed there. He also had connections with Madero, Carranza, Obregón, Calles, and Gonzalo N. Santos.

General Pascual Ortiz Rubio (1930-1932) a native of the state of Michoacán, belonged to the Obregón group. He was Ambassador to Brazil and returned to Mexico to serve in the Portes Gil cabinet. He had connections with Madero, Carranza, Obregón, Calles, Gonzalo N. Santos, and Cárdenas. He was apparently elected president to secure the control of the presidency by Obregonistas, but was forced by Calles to resign (xx) .

Abelardo Rodríguez (1932-1934), a native of the state of Sonora was governor of Baja California, Secretary of War and the Navy and of Industry, Trade and Labor when he was appointed substitute president to Ortiz Rubio. He had connections with Carranza, Obregón, Calles, Ortiz Rubio, Gonzalo N. Santos, and Cárdenas. He had previously been governor of the Territory of North Baja California.

General Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), a native of the state of Michoacán, rose to the presidency due to his military merits facing the Victoriano Huerta rebellion of 1913, his political merits as governor of Michoacán, and his membership in the Sonora group (Díaz Serrano 1989). Calles was his commander. He had a close relationship to Pascual Ortiz Rubio and had connections with Cándido Aguilar, Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada, and Heriberto Jara. He also had support from his predecessor president, General Abelardo Rodríguez.

General Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946), a native of the state of Puebla, was closely associated with Cárdenas, whom he accompanied both in military campaigns and in politics. The relationship between the two dates back 19 years prior to Avila Camacho's rise to the Presidency (Garrido in Nuncio 1987). He also had connections with Portes Gil, Heriberto Jara and Gonzalo N. Santos.

Miguel Alemán (1946-1952), the first civilian elected in the post-revolutionary period, had strong military connections, and following the military model created a stronghold in his native Veracruz (xxi) . His father, also named Miguel Alemán, was a general who had connections with Carranza and also was stationed in Tampico. General Alemán fought against the Sonora group, but this does not seem to have affected his son's career. Alemán Jr. was supported by General Cándido Aguilar (xxii) , Carranza's son in law (See Fig. 3) and developed connections with other nodes in the network, notably Cárdenas, Avila Camacho, and Sánchez Taboada. He was Avila Camacho's Secretary of Gobernación and campaign manager. Miguel Alemán changed some of the recruitment patterns, introducing an education connection into his cabinet which influenced the future of the network.

Starting with Avila Camacho, a combination of regional and military connections played an increasing role. This in part explains why Captain Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, a native of Veracruz, rose to the presidency in 1952. His candidacy was a compromise among different groups in the network. He was an army captain and General Jacinto B. Treviño's private secretary. Generals Cándido Aguilar and Miguel Henriquez supported him for president. He had connections with Sánchez Taboada, Gonzalo N. Santos, and Heriberto Jara. He was also Alemán's Secretary of Gobernación and campaign manager (See Fig. 4).

Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964) had a mix of connections in the network, including generals and the new generation of politicians. He was the private Secretary of the governor of the State of Mexico, Col. Filiberto Gómez, and established a connection with the Alemán group when he and Ramos Millán, one of Alemán's closest associates, served as congressmen from the State of Mexico. López Mateos, as Secretary General of the PRI, was Ruiz Cortines's presidential campaign manager and his Secretary of Labor.

The network's geographic component helps explain the rise of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970), a native of Puebla, the home state and seat of power of the Avila Camacho family and General Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada, but he also developed connections with the Miguel Alemán group, mainly with Antonio Carrillo Flores and Hugo B. Margain. He was López Mateos' Secretary of Gobernación.

Luis Echeverría (1970-1976), a native of Mexico City, is the last to enjoy clear military support. Two generals influenced his career: his mentor, General Sánchez Taboada, who was Chairman of the PRI and had great power in Puebla, and General Jose Guadalupe Zuno, his father-in-law, former governor of Jalisco and connected to Obregón. When Díaz Ordaz became Secretary of Gobernación, Echeverría was appointed undersecretary, and when the former became president, Echeverría became his Secretary of Gobernación.

By 1970, the power of the military sub-network began to wane, as another generation of politicians came to the fore. These were a group of state financiers who rose to power through the management of a different systemic function: planning and implementing fiscal and monetary policies. They interacted and competed with the military sub-network until they won the presidency. Throughout this period, conflict was contained and the political system was stable.

VI. 2. PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSIONS INFLUENCED BY FINANCIERS

Financiers consolidated control of government financial operations, particularly the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Mexico and the investment commission which later was transformed into the Department of Budgeting and Planning. Political competition did exist, but there was no conflict because each sub-network controlled one basic systemic function: defense and finance. This sub-network reached the first level of government during the Miguel Alemán administration and developed until Miguel De la Madrid assumed the presidency.

Antonio Ortiz Mena may be the classic financier and the link between the two sub-networks (see Figure 1). He was a public official during the Portes Gil administration, and perhaps due to his connection with Alemán--they were schoolmates in high school--during the Ruiz Cortines administration he was appointed Director of the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (the Mexican Social Security Administration). He consolidated a power base as Secretary of Finance during the López Mateos and Díaz Ordaz administrations. When he resigned in 1970 he became president of the Inter American Development Bank until 1987. In 1988 his nephew Carlos Salinas became president and appointed him president of the government-owned bank BANAMEX to continue his influence in economic affairs until the bank was privatized (8-30-1991).

Jose López Portillo, a native of Mexico City, could be considered a transition president between the two sub-networks, although he seemed to be the proof for those who believe in the pendulum theory. It looked like some occult force was balancing Echeverría's excesses, but the 1976 presidential succession could have been a compromise between sub-networks similar to the Ruiz Cortines election. López Portillo's father was a career officer and graduate of the Colegio Militar, yet there is no evidence that this fact gave him any advantage. The peculiarity of the case is that the incumbent president favored a childhood friend, while at the same time giving an opportunity to an "expert" who could rule the country in the midst of what was perceived as an incipient economic crisis. López Portillo, Echeverría's campaign manager, had been considered a planner since his tenure at the Ministry of National Patrimony (xxiii) , and an expert in finance; in fact, he rose to the presidency from the Ministry of Finance.

López Portillo's place is at the intersection between the sub-networks. He was an attorney by education and a politician by training, with a governmental approach already oriented to technical-type solutions and with connections to the Alemán group via Hugo Margain and Mario Ramon Beteta (Figure 3).

Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) was born in Colima but moved to Mexico City when he was two years old. His career developed completely within the financial sector of the government. He was General Director of Public Debt in the Ministry of Finance, Deputy Director of Finance for the Mexican oil company Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), returned to the Ministry of Finance as Undersecretary of that entity, and after a stint at the Ministry of Budget and Planning, he moved to the presidency after serving as López Portillo's campaign manager. His strongest connection was with Raœl Salinas Lozano, a member of a powerful clique including Margain and Beteta.

Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) leaves no doubt about the political control of the financial sub-network and its continuation in power. He was recommended to De la Madrid by Hugo B. Margain, used the connections of his father, who was Secretary of Commerce in the López Mateos administration (xxiv) , and became De la Madrid's second in command, his Secretary of Budget and Planning and campaign manager (xxv) . It was clear that the financiers had no intention of leaving the presidency. Both the Luis Donaldo Colosio and Ernesto Zedillo nominations responded to the rationale of the financiers' sub-network, which by 1988 seems to have created a new dynamic of political recruitment and a new set of connections for promotions. But something was already happening to change the network's historical evolution. The hotly contested 1988 presidential election, in which two members of the network competed against each other, suggests that something happened to the principles of discipline that gave strength to the Mexican political system. In fact, we find that the sub-networks confronted each other openly, creating a serious threat to political stability.

VII. THE 1988 ELECTIONS. DID ANYTHING BREAK IN THE NETWORK?

For political actors, historical background has little to do with present performance. The politicos can claim having achieved sustained growth with low inflation rates, though the financial problems which emerged and which may have helped the financiers rise to power represented merely the consequence of an economic instability that had been simmering for decades.

The financiers could not publicly recognize the historical origin of what they termed a "crisis," because it would mean admitting that the left-wing groups were correct when they blamed the crisis on the capitalist system (Martínez Rios 1970) and the PRI as its promoter. They would be forced to accept their role managing and formulating financial policies. During their tenure the Mexican economy finally collapsed, and the current and long-lasting "economic crisis" emerged with high inflation, public debt, recession and unemployment.

The financiers had two presidential terms to correct economic instabilities, including an oil boom where López Portillo declared that Mexicans needed to learn how to manage abundance. By 1987, financiers had been unable to correct a rapidly deteriorating economy, increasing social costs, and political conflict. This led politicos to challenge the continuity of the financiers in power to remedy the system's weaknesses. Politicos claimed that financiers had failed in their area of expertise: the economy (xxvi) .

The financiers changed many of the political rules and values that provided systemic cohesion. The presidential cabinet ended its role as an equilibrium instrument. Instead of balancing regions, political groups, subgroups, and camarillas, the cabinet began to be used to reward bureaucratic merit, which in part began at graduate school abroad (xxvii) . López Portillo began excluding groups from the cabinet, concentrating on his former colleagues at the Ministry of National Patrimony. De la Madrid closed this body even more by including a majority of former employees of the Bank of Mexico and its subsidiary institutions (trust funds). This alienated political support among the party's rank and file, and a cleavage developed between the political and the bureaucratic machines.

Instead of political merit, financiers rewarded bureaucratic obedience, thereby weakening the system of political control. We find faster political careers among financiers than among politicos, and consequently there is an increasing tendency among high officials to lack political experience. In contrast to presidents after the revolution, since Echeverría none of the presidents has been elected to any position before assuming the presidency.

Another political element in the controversy was the acknowledgment that the PRI was losing its bases of support. Politicos had built a corporatist apparatus, including a capacity for electoral fraud capable of winning elections. The candidate's popularity was irrelevant because of a strong ability for political mobilization and electoral fraud perpetrated with a rationale of coalition building. Loyalty to the system was always rewarded for groups as well as individuals. Moreover, financiers unloaded the burden of the economic crisis on workers and the poor segments of society, challenging the role of mass organizations and their leadership and their interaction with the PRI and the government. The party was transformed into a bureaucratic machine, losing the strong grip politicos had on the political system and the vote.

The opposition had victories in various municipal elections (Rodríguez and Ward 1995) and challenged the PRI in gubernatorial elections. In fact, the opposition claims to have won several of these stolen elections (xxviii) . Perhaps more significant for the PRI was the existence of a new opposition that ceased to be loyal in the sense of being merely a member of the cast. We can discuss whether the PRI's institutional weakening is due to the policies followed by financiers or to political conditions historically established by politicos, but beyond the academic value of this discussion, the fact is that under the financiers the opposition increased its share of political positions, and the corporatist system was weakened. The PRI's leadership could no longer take for granted a national accord among its members. All these elements led the politicos to challenge the capacity of financiers to stay in power and manage the political system.

In 1987, the dispute between politicos and financiers surfaced, based perhaps on the fact that society had a poor opinion of the leadership.(xxix) Therefore, a financier candidate, Salinas, ran the risk of losing the presidential election (xxx) . This perception was based on a lost appeal to mobilize the masses. Peasant associations had no land to broker (xxxi) , corrupt union leaders blocked democracy; and professional organizations who were part of the PRI could not assure its members of political victories. This scenario proved to be right when the PRI lost the Federal District in the 1988 congressional election. Had the opposition presented a unified front, the PRI would have won only one congressional seat out of forty (xxxii) . For the first time in Mexico's history the opposition won both senate seats in Mexico City. Financiers had no strategy to reinforce the party apparatus and their policies chipped away what little credibility the corporatist institutions still enjoyed.

Another element in the struggle between the sub-networks was the country's evolution and transformation of electoral clienteles, in such a way that political parties seemed to converge in the center, casting their ideology aside and fighting for the same block of votes (xxxiii) . In 1988 a coalition of left-oriented parties nominated Heberto Castillo, who had always considered or labeled himself as a non-Marxist leftist. He subsequently withdrew his candidacy in favor of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, a former PRI governor and the son of General Lázaro Cárdenas, the most revered priista in the twentieth century. Meanwhile, the PRI moved to the right, losing ground and the capacity to convince society of the merits of the new economic policy. Financiers positioned the PRI to compete against a more reliable opposition while alienating the corporatist structure.

In 1987, it also appeared that society's tolerance was approaching a critical level. Notwithstanding a prolonged economic crisis, social and economic expectations decreased, and the tolerable gap between expectations and social achievements had not grown to the point of causing political disruption (Davis 1969). This was a good omen for political stability, but not for the PRI. Mexican society was not at the brink of a generalized violent outburst or armed insurgence, but one of the results of this prolonged crisis could be social and symbolic deterioration (Schmidt 1995, 1990a).

Financiers were unable to solve the financial crisis and were not ready to distribute political benefits within and outside the party. Under their rule, people could expect increased authoritarianism. Financiers were unable to solve the political puzzle of combining economic recovery with political control while continuing their monopoly of power. This scenario presented the feasibility of the end of the PRI's hegemony and a potential for instability and political violence (xxiv) .

The unavoidable moment of confrontation between the two sub-networks was the nomination of the presidential candidate. Candidates supported by politicos had not succeded in previous elections. Porfirio Muñoz Ledo and Augusto Gómez Villanueva failed in the López Portillo election. Emilio Mœjica and Enrique Olivares Santana failed in De la Madrid's election because of the strong grip the financiers had on the presidency and the selection mechanism. In 1987, politicos tried to force the nomination of a candidate. This was done by creating the PRI's Democratic Current/Corriente Democratica, which advocated the party's democratization, leaving the incumbent president out of the nomination process in order to reduce the chances of a financier nominee (Salinas). All the efforts failed, and when Salinas was nominated, the democratic current left the party. Through a series of alliances with former loyal opposition parties, the candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was launched.

Systemically, the network of power provided the official and opposition candidates, accumulating over 80% of the votes, but a profound schism was created. The other political and ideological forces witnessed a family quarrel unable to provide a unified alternative, while some people were ready for a political revolt. Cárdenas's commitment to stability and his allegiance and loyalty to the revolution saved the political system, initiating a new political game where the monopoly of one party was in fact terminated.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Mexican network of power has been the cohesive element helping to avoid conflict and sustain political stability through the creation of institutions supported by loyalty and discipline which have helped control the key political process: presidential succession. The network of power has controlled presidential succession, including the 1988 presidential election, in which it provided both the official and the opposition candidate.

Two sub-networks have dominated the political system since 1920, developing the post-revolutionary ideological and institutional framework. Each one has specialized in systemic functions: defense and political control, and management and regulation of money. The fact that both sub-networks coexisted for sixty years under accepted written and unwritten rules and accepted norms and values(xxxv) explains to a large extent Mexic's political stability.

In the 1988 presidential election and throughout Mexican history, the network of power proved its capability to absorb instabilities. The network is elastic and provides different ideological alternatives through a combination of two types of politicians: as defined in this essay, the politicos and the financiers. Both cooperated closely for decades, creating a sui generis political system that has amazed the world.

In the 1988 presidential succession the balance of power remained in the hands of the financiers, and politicos could only aspire to subsidiary positions which, according to the rules of the system, jeopardized and estranged them from the spheres of power, where the destiny of the country and the future of political careers are decided. Politicos could foresee the end of their political calling. Paradoxically, a major crisis such as the split in the PRI has allowed more competition which could contain political conflict. In Mexico, instability has led more to the advance of democracy than to dictatorship.

Apparently, the old revolutionary arrangement was terminated in 1987. Now we are witnessing an open confrontation between the two sub-networks on a non-agreement base. Salinas evidently pursued radical economic changes and was unable to reconcile all forces. This might be the reason for political assassinations and their consequent instability. The changes in the network are seemingly irreversible, which may suggest the inception of a political game based on new rules, new trends, and, even though the signs are not there, optimistically, a new Mexican political culture and eventually democratization in Mexico.

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Table 1. Clique of five Mexican politicias

* This article was previously presented at the LASA XIX International Congress, Washington, D.C. September 28-30, 1995. The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of Jorge Castro and Alejandro Ruiz in the creation of the data base and the valuable comments from Professors Miguel Angel Centeno, Roederic Ai Camp, John Peller, José García, and Weston Agor to early drafts of this paper and Richard Ford, who helped edit the manuscript. Equipment for the Laboratorio de Gráficas where the data base is housed was donated by Hewlett Packard. This research was supported in part by a grant from the Dirección General de Asuntos del Personal Académico, UNAM, through Proyect IN310296.

i Raul Salinas Jr. was head of the rural roads program [Camino de Mano de Obra ] (1976) and "caminos rurales" (1977-1981), which created jobs in marginal areas; later on he played a major role in CONASUPO (the staple goods public corporation) 1983-1990. Araujo was the leader of the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) (1991-1995). De la Mora was the head of BANRURAL (the public bank that granted loans in the rural areas) (1988-1994), and Muñoz Rocha was the president of the congressional committee on water (1991-1994).

ii We call politicians the members of the group supported by military, and financiers the group in control of the financial operation of the state. We do not agree with the differentiation made between politicians and technocrats, which, in our opinion, represents a simplification of the historical and political characteristics of each one of the groups.

iii The origin of this concept apparently was when Plutarco Elias Calles offered General Joaquín Amaro the Presidency of the Republic to replace Pascual Ortiz Rubio. Amaro replied: "You are mistaken. You don't know General Amaro yet. You yourself have taught us that to occupy this position the nation should be consulted and I have never consulted the nation. Therefore, I«m going to break that son of a gun's head for having invented this, so that he will not divide the Revolutionary family" (Campbell 1980: 53). For the discussion of the revolutionary family, see Camp (1990), Brandenburg (1964), Needler (1971)

iv Camp (1989). Chapter XXVII refers to one case where for political reasons promotion was denied.

v For a long time people spoke of "disappeared" civilians in Mexico with no proof until a Mexican army deserter who requested political asylum in Canada declared that the army was to kill and "disappear" 60 civilians and that he knew about at least one hundred more cases (Rother 1989).

vi Lázaro Cárdenas' son Cuauhtémoc was Governor of Michoacán from 1980 to 1986.

vii Those offices developed from an investment commission to an underSecretary of the presidency, and subsequently to the Department of Budget and Planninging (Secretaría de Programación y Presupuesto). In 1992 this last department was merged with the Department of the Treasury. The public expenditure function was transferred to the Department of Ecology and Urban Development to create the Department of Social Development (SEDESOL).

viii Explaining tapadismo, Luis Echeverría said the concept derives from cock fights, where there is a "covered" cock and people bet without knowing which cock it is, and therefore they are considered to be supporting the "veiled." Thence, says Echeverría, comes the concept mi gallo /"my cock" to whom the politicians refer to designate the politician they support (Suárez 1984).

ix These images could be influenced by Michelangelo's mural at the Sistine Chapel, where God is transmitting life to man with his finger.

x Regarding Zedillo, recently, a distinguished priista told me (s.s.): "I don't like him, but he is my president."

xi Elections can be considered as acculturation since "the participants in a ritual are sharing communicative experiences" (Adler-Lomnitz and Perez-Lizaur 1987).

xii Schmidt (1991) quotes Gustavo Díaz Ordaz's private Secretary as saying that he informed the former presidents prior to Echeverría's designation.

xiii Some conditions have changed: for example, having been elected to public office such as governor or senator has disappeared since 1970.

xiv The closest we have to this process in the US is the selection of the vice presidential running mate.

xv One problem with this theory is the inconsistency of indicators to analyze all presidential administrations.

xvi Colosio's designation fits this pattern. He was Secretary of Social Development in charge of public expenditures (see footnote # 3), and Zedillo was Secretary of Budget and Planning before being appointed Secretary of Education. In all the cases except for Zedillo, the Secretary's origin refers to his last position before the nomination.

xvii Popular wisdom has compared the presidential cabinet with the College of Cardinals, from which the new Pope is elected; consequently, secretaries are nicknamed cardinals.

xviii There is evidence that presidents do not stop exercising their power when they leave the presidency. On Cárdenas, see Hernández (1991).

xix Commentators frequently say that the political merit of the former governor of Baja California, Xicotencatl Leyva Mortera, 1983-1988, was his family relationship with Miguel Alemán Jr., the obvious leader of the Alemán group. Although Leyva was removed from the governorship for being extremely corrupt, even by PRI standards, he still is untouchable. Apparently, the network is protecting him. (Miller McDonnell 1989) Alemán Jr. was appointed by Salinas ambassador to promote tourism, which activity his father was engaged in since he left the presidency until his death in 1983, and was elected Senator for Veracruz in 1991.

xx At the historical distance it appears to be a solid network, but differences existed between groups. However, all competed inside the network (Meyer, Segovia, Lajous 1978). The undisciplined groups were confronted and repressed strongly.

xxi In the last two gubernatorial elections in Veracruz, Alemán Jr. has been mentioned as a potential candidate. Presently he is senator.

xxii Gil, Schmidt, and Castro (1993) described the connections that facilitated Alemán«s career to the presidency and prevented him from appointing his succesor.

xxiii (Carrillo. 1980) describes a planning group to which several members of the López Portillo cabinet belonged and where he served as technical Secretary. During the López Portillo administration he was the president's Coordinator of Administrative Studies.

xxiv Camp (1990) describes Salinas's political connections, including his family relation with Ortiz Mena.

xxv The importance this department has acquired since the López Portillo administration suggests the political and administrative priorities financiers had in the midst of an economic crisis. This might indicate why, when the country needed political control, presidents came from the Department of the Gobernación, whose responsibility is internal security.

xxvi A possible analogy can be made with the Falkland Islands War, where the Argentine military failed at what they were supposed to be experts in: war. The consequence was that they had to relinquish power, returning it to the hands of civilians.

xxvii Here we can make an interesting comparison. The military began to be promoted by their professional studies and de-politicized politics; paraphrasing Loveman and Davis (1978), financiers reward professional studies and de-politicized politics.

xxviii The negotiation of the gubernatorial election in Nayarit in 1975 with the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) is still a scandal in Mexico. PPS exchanged the governorship for the Oaxaca senator seat for for its leader in 1976 (Hinojosa Office. Former presidents will try to keep their groups intact in subsequent administrations, even though when the presidential candidate is nominated a regrouping process starts, where coalitions and alliances are redrawn, and new connections and relationships are created. Nevertheless, one can always trace the genealogical line of a political personage or institution.

xxx Since Echeverría, society in general has reacted aggressively vis-a-vis the president. López Portillo was nicknamed El Perro /"the Dog" and insulted towards the end of his administration. De la Madrid was regarded as a timid president and criticized for his indecisive attitude during the 1985 earthquake, when he gave the impression the government was paralyzed. For an analysis of societal response against presidents see Schmidt (1990a, 1996).

xxxi Some of the politicians' arguments contained in this section come from an interview with Porfirio Muñoz Ledo while he still was a member of the PRI's corriente democrática or democratic current. In 1987 he became one of the leaders of the Frente Democrático Nacional. In 1988 he was one of four opposition senators elected. In 1989 he became one of the leaders of the Partido de la Revolución Democratica. In 1990 he ran for governor of Guanajuato and lost. In 1993 he was elected president of the PRD.

xxxii Salinas, in his first address to the nation, confirmed that Agrarian Reform as a land distribution policy was over. In 1991 he changed the constitution to allow the sale of ejido land.

xxxiii On the 1988 elections see (López 1988).

xxxiv Downs (1973), suggests that parties tend to move to the variable is the coalitions in the network of power; thus, discerning the network's creation and development is an important contribution for understanding the Mexican political system, stability and capability to contain and control social and political conflict. A strong network of power has eliminated external competition while creating a cohesive and loyal group, resulting in an authoritarian but stable political system.

xxxviii The opposition increased electoral victories, but financiers refused to recognize they had facilitated the eruption of political violence. (Miller 1990, Vera 1990).

xxxix Some analysts have tried to analyze Latin America using U.S. values as a paradigm (Tomasek 1966, Busey 1985).